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PREFACE
U.S. military victory in Iraq has given rise to a new and equally important challenge: rebuilding the
country and delivering on President Bush’s promise of a free and democratic future for the Iraqi peo-
ple. Yet post-war reconstruction and transition to self-governance are complex and extremely difficult
challenges, and the case of Iraq poses unique problems. It also appears to be the first case in which
the provisions on occupation of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Conventions have been formally applied. 
The plans put forth by the administration for the reconstruction of Iraq are divergent from the past in
significant ways. 
First, the United Nations is not playing the leading role in reconstruction efforts and the development
of a new government in Iraq. Prior to the adoption of Resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003, this process
had been controlled largely by the United States, which had involved the UN and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) largely at its discretion. It remains to be seen exactly how the reconstruction
process will unfold, but it seems clear that the U.S. — and not the UN — will play the dominant role,
albeit with UN Security Council endorsement of its approach. 
Second, President Bush has given the U.S. Department of Defense responsibility for reconstruction. In
past cases, civilian agencies such as the State Department and its Agency for International
Development (USAID) were charged with leading U.S. efforts to reconstruct nations after conflicts.  
This booklet, the product of a collaborative effort by various groups involved in policy and on-the-
ground assistance in Iraq, is meant to provide concise background information on post-war recon-
struction generally, and on Iraq more specifically. It deals briefly with the legal issues entailed in
reconstructing Iraq and details both international humanitarian law and Security Council mandates,
but the majority of the document is devoted to presenting the larger policy issues entailed in the
reconstruction effort. The booklet includes basic information on a wide range of topics, including:
 The traditional actors involved in reconstruction, their roles, and the guidelines which gov-
ern their actions
 Iraq’s short-, medium- and long-term reconstruction needs
 The history of recent reconstruction efforts undertaken by the U.S. and/or the UN 
 Attitudes of Americans and others about the process of reconstruction. 
Our goal is to provide a useful research compendium that will help interested parties to evaluate
reconstruction activities in Iraq.1
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1 Please note that while every effort has been made to provide up-to-date information about various post-conflict
reconstruction activities in Iraq, the nature of fast-moving events on the ground guarantees that some information
provided in this booklet will become outdated. Therefore, the Open Society Institute will periodically post updates
of significant changes to the information contained in this document, and will list new publications of major
reports on Iraqi reconstruction. Please refer to http://www.osi-dc.org for these features. 















THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
INTERVENTION IN IRAQ
Disarmament, Regime Change, and Reconstruction   
From August 2002 to March 2003, the Bush administration offered a number of reasons to justify mil-
itary action in Iraq. These ranged from the need to bring about regime change to disarming the Iraqi
regime of its weapons of mass destruction to achieving freedom for the people of Iraq.2
In legal terms, the Bush administration ultimately based its decision to launch a military strike against
Iraq on past UN Security Council resolutions about Iraq’s failure to comply with mandatory disarma-
ment of weapons of mass destruction. Members of the administration made frequent and specific ref-
erence to using force in order to enforce Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002, which—in the words
of President Bush—“declared Iraq in material breach of its longstanding obligations, demanding once
again Iraq’s full and immediate disarmament, and promised serious consequences if the regime refused
to comply.”3 
Neither Resolution 1441 nor others, however, include any mandate for the U.S, the coalition, or the
UN to undertake post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, some member states of the UN disagreed
with the claim that Resolution 1441 was a proper legal
basis for U.S. military intervention. This contention
initially left some nations reluctant to cooperate in
reconstruction activities without a further resolution. 
On May 22, the Security Council passed Resolution
1483 with a vote of 14-0.4 It remains to be seen whether
member states will find the resolution a sufficient man-
date for all future reconstruction activities in Iraq, or if
further resolutions will be needed to deal with such
issues as peacekeeping or justice mechanisms.
A Mandate for Reconstruction:
Resolution 1483
Resolution 1483, sponsored by the U.S., UK, and Spain,
authorizes the United States to control Iraq and its oil
until there is an internationally recognized Iraqi govern-
ment. It contains an array of provisions mainly relating
to oil revenue, lifting of the sanctions, the role of the UN
through its appointment of a Special Representative, and
the future of the humanitarian Oil for Food program.
Following is a list of key matters covered:
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION IN IRAQ
Highlights:
 The Bush administration offered multiple reasons to
justify military action in Iraq—ranging from the need
to bring about regime change to achieving freedom
for the people of Iraq—and ultimately based its deci-
sion on past Security Council resolutions on disarma-
ment. These resolutions did not include a mandate for
post-conflict reconstruction.
 The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 on May
22, 2003, granting wide interim governance powers and
control over the collection and disbursement of Iraqi oil
revenue to the United States and its coalition partners,
and conferring on them the status of an occupying power.
 Resolution 1483 grants the U.S. and its partners authori-
zation to carry out activities beyond those explicitly
authorized under existing international humanitarian law.
There may be discrepancies between existing internation-
al humanitarian law and the terms of Resolution 1483. 
2 For example, in remarks with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan on February 27, President George W. Bush stat-
ed that “the mission now is to disarm Saddam Hussein, in the name of peace. And we will disarm Saddam Hussein.”
And in a subsequent speech to the nation on the eve of war, March 19, 2003, President Bush asserted that “The peo-
ple of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the
peace with weapons of mass murder…we will meet that threat now…so that we do not have to meet it later.” Regime
change became incorporated into the notion of full disarmament, as President Bush explained on February 27:
“Should we be forced to commit our troops because of [Saddam Hussein’s] failure to disarm, the mission will be com-
plete disarmament, which will mean regime change.”
3 Remarks of President George W. Bush, Azores Conference, Azores, Portugal, March 16, 2003. The President also stat-
ed that “That resolution was passed unanimously and its logic is inescapable; the Iraqi regime will disarm itself, or
the Iraqi regime will be disarmed by force. And the regime has not disarmed itself.” See also Secretary of State Colin
Powell’s speech to the UN Security Council on Feb. 5, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm.
4 The full text of this resolution is reproduced in Appendix 1 on page 58. It is also available on the UN website. 
 No time limit for the resolution. Resolution 1483 contains no time limit, but does include a
provision that the Security Council will review the resolution within twelve months. Under
these terms, only an affirmative vote by the Security Council, subject to any one permanent
member-state’s veto, would be able to alter the resolution. In effect, the resolution has a built-
in automatic renewal. 
 Occupation and the Authority. The resolution notes that a letter was sent by the U.S. and the
UK to the President of the Security Council on May 8, 2003, in which these two powers, col-
lectively known as “the Authority,” acknowledge and accept the legal status of occupying
power in Iraq and all of the attendant rights and obligations under existing international law.
It also notes the possibility that now or in the future, other states may work under the
Authority in its capacity as an occupying force.
The resolution states that the role of the Authority in Iraq will be to “promote the welfare of
the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory,” and to do so in a man-
ner consistent with relevant international law. It is unclear exactly how this authority to
administer the territory will interact with other international law such as the provisions on
occupation contained in the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations (for more infor-
mation, see page 6). 
 Oil revenue and financing the reconstruction. The resolution creates a Development Fund
for Iraq, which is to be held by the Central Bank of Iraq and will receive all oil revenue and
other designated funds. The Fund’s resources will be disbursed at the discretion of the
Authority in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration, in a transparent manner, for
humanitarian purposes, economic reconstruction, continued disarmament, and “for other
purposes benefiting the Iraqi people.” The Fund will have an international advisory and
monitoring board whose members will include representatives of the Secretary General, the
World Bank, the IMF, and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. The dis-
bursement process will not be subject to the decisions of the Board, and the Board does not
include members of Iraqi civil society. 
The resolution also indemnifies all oil revenue from legal claims or contest by providing the
proceeds from oil sales and revenue collected by the Fund with the privileges and immuni-
ties enjoyed by the United Nations. The noted exception to this indemnity is with regard to
claims about ecological disasters or oil spills, in which case the Fund is not protected.
Finally, the resolution reduces the amount of oil revenue being paid to the UN compensation
committee—which deals with addressing claims on Iraq from the 1991 war against Kuwait—
from the current 25 percent to five percent, effective immediately. Resolution 1483 also calls
on all states with Iraqi assets to immediately freeze and transfer them to the Development
Fund, and maintains that any claims on these funds must be brought before a future perma-
nent government of Iraq. It does not set aside any funds for the UN disarmament process,
nor for the Kurds who prior to the war received 13 percent of the Oil for Food proceeds.5















5 This provision was contained in Security Council Resolution 986 (1995), which decreed that 13 percent of all UN-
authorized humanitarian resources go to northern Kurdish areas.
 Oil for Food program. On a related topic, the Secretary General is instructed to
dismantle the Oil for Food program—which was previously the only legal conduit
for selling Iraqi oil and disbursing the revenue—in six months’ time and to turn
all of its existing revenue, currently in a United Nations escrow account, over to
the Fund. He is also instructed to immediately transfer $1 billion of unencum-
bered funds from Oil for Food to the Development Fund. In the termination
process, the Secretary General is given ultimate discretion over which existing
contracts to honor and which to postpone or cancel. (There are many outstanding
contracts worth billions of dollars, most notably to Russia, that have yet to be
resolved.) It is unclear from the terms of the resolution whether or how the
Authority will continue humanitarian distribution of food and supplies. 
 Sanctions. All previous sanctions levied against Iraq, except for those relating to
arms sales, are lifted by the resolution. Previous resolutions required that disarma-
ment be complete and certified before the lifting of sanctions could occur; this
requirement is effectively overridden by Resolution 1483. 
 Disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The resolution does not contain a specific plan
or mandate for the continued disarmament of Iraq. It notes, in a preambulatory clause, the
importance of disarmament and its “eventual confirmation.” It seems to suggest that the
Authority will continue to take the lead in conducting disarmament and will report back to the
Security Council on its activities. Finally, it leaves ambiguous the future role of international
weapons inspectors by stating that the Council will “revisit” the mandates of previous resolutions
on disarmament, leaving open whether this will mean fulfilling or dismantling such mandates. 
 Involving the United Nations. The main way in which the resolution involves the United
Nations is through the instruction that the Secretary General appoint an independent Special
Representative. The Special Representative is given an “independent” role and is meant to
report back regularly to the Security Council on his activities under the resolution, including
coordinating all UN activities in Iraq, especially relating to humanitarian work. 
The Special Representative is also meant to assist the people of Iraq by, among other activi-
ties, working with the international community to facilitate reconstruction of infrastructure,
to promote economic reconstruction and development, and to rebuild the Iraqi civilian
police force; by working with the Authority and with Iraqis to form local and national insti-
tutions for representative governance; and by encouraging international efforts for legal and
judicial reform. 
 Governance of Iraq. Resolution 1483 states that “the people of Iraq with the help of the
Authority and working with the Special Representative,” will form a transitional administra-
tion that will operate until an internationally recognized, representative government is
formed and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority. This clause leaves ambiguous which
entity will take the lead in forming an interim government, and whether UN activities on
governance will be subject to ultimate approval by the Authority. 
In terms of creating a permanent Iraqi government, the resolution states only that the
Authority, the Special Representative, and Iraqis will have to work together toward its forma-
tion and that it will have to be “internationally recognized.” It is also unclear how the neces-

















Nations, May 22, 2003:
“Russia is satisfied with the
compromise [on Resolution
1483]. It clearly brings this
situation back within the
international law area, and
thus allows all countries who
want to help to do so on a
legal basis.”
sary assumption by a future Iraqi government of the “responsibilities of the
Authority” will take place, and whether this will be a strict benchmark for a new
government to meet before the Authority will confer recognition of its legitimacy. 
Legal Status of U.S.-Led Coalition
On May 1, 2003, President Bush announced that “major combat operations in Iraq
have ended,” which marked a new chapter in operations on the ground in Iraq.6 His
pronouncement did not, however, immediately resolve the legal status of U.S. forces
in the region. It was only with the passage of Resolution 1483 more than three
weeks later that the U.S. formally accepted its status as occupier in Iraq and agreed
to abide by the applicable provisions of international law.7 Formal recognition by the
Authority of its status as an occupying power appears to mark the first time since entry into force that
the Fourth Geneva Convention’s provisions on occupation will be applied.8
The resolution of the question had significant implications for which government or international
institutions would be responsible for providing humanitarian relief and other services for the Iraqi
people. Among other provisions, these governing instruments of international humanitarian law
require that an occupying force provide for the basic security and health of the
country’s populace, and, in general, prohibit the occupier from changing existing
laws. (For more information on the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions,
see the pull-out box on page 6.) 
Resolution 1483 formally confers the status of occupier upon the Authority, but it
also permits the U.S. and its partners to undertake activities beyond those that are
explicitly authorized under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague
Regulations. While the Convention and the Regulations state that an occupier may
administer the territory, many components of the U.S. plans for reconstruction in
Iraq can arguably be construed as going beyond what these humanitarian instru-
ments expressly or implicitly authorize. An occupying power as envisioned in the
Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations is essentially a “trustee”
which is authorized to administer, but not to substantially transform, the country
and its institutions. Thus, radical transformation of the country’s governmental insti-
tutions, of its legal code, and of the governing mechanisms for controlling natural
resources — all of which could be construed as part of the democratization process
promised to the Iraqi people by President Bush—arguably go beyond what the gov-
erning instruments of humanitarian law permit an occupying power to do. 
However, Resolution 1483 will likely confer greater legitimacy upon the U.S. plans
for the transformation of Iraq, even those components which might not ordinarily
6 Remarks by President George W. Bush, USS Abraham Lincoln, At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California,  May 1,
2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html.
7 For many weeks prior to the announcement, there had been considerable contention in the international arena over
whether the United States and its coalition forces should be defined as an “occupying power,” and required to act in
accordance with the attendant legal obligations spelled out under the provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations and
the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. U.S. officials repeatedly declared that they were “abiding by international con-
ventions,” while at the same time asserting that the U.S.-led coalition was not an occupying force. (Jonathan Flower,
“UN Secretary General: Coalition is the Occupying Force in Iraq,” Associated Press, April 24, 2003.) Brigadier
General Vincent Brooks, deputy operations director at U.S. Central Command, stated on April 14, 2003 that “we’re
still a liberating force, and that’s how we’re approaching our operations.” (Remarks of Brigadier General Vincent
Brooks, CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing, April 14, 2003.) A “liberating force” is not a category defined
by international law. These arguments ensued despite the provision of the Hague Regulations which states that inter-
national law governing occupying forces takes effect “as soon as the armed forces of a foreign power have secured
effective control over a territory that is not its own” (Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations).
8 While occupations—either contested or otherwise—have occurred since the entry into force of the Fourth
Convention, such as the case of Iraq in Kuwait or Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, those states have never formally
agreed to abide by and apply the provisions dealing with occupation. Factual existence of an occupation and consen-
sus by the international community does not necessarily mean that the state in question will accept and agree to be
bound by the formal application of the related legal provisions. Hence, the U.S. acceptance of its status as an occupy-
ing power in Iraq and of the related legal provisions appears to constitute the first such instance since the entry into
force of the Geneva Conventions.















President George W. Bush,
May 1, 2003, aboard the
USS Lincoln:
“Other nations in history
have fought in foreign lands
and remained to occupy and
exploit. Americans, following
a battle, want nothing more
than to return home.”
Security Council Resolution
1483, May 22, 2003:
“Noting the letter of 8 May
2003 from the Permanent
Representatives of the
United States of America and
the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland
to the President of the
Security Council (S/2003/538)
and recognizing the specific
authorities, responsibilities,
and obligations under appli-
cable international law of
these states as occupying
















OBLIGATIONS OF AN OCCUPYING FORCE
The 1907 Hague Conventions and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 are
the principal instruments of international humanitarian law (IHL), which is also known as the laws of war or of armed
conflict. Most states today are bound in the conduct of their military operations by the Geneva Conventions and the cus-
tomary law reflected in the Hague Conventions and Protocol One. 
Following is a list of key duties and obligations of an occupying power according to the terms of the 1907 Hague
Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention.9
1. Respect the human rights of the local population
“Protected persons …shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present
Convention…” including the right of self determination.10
2. Ensure public order and safety
The Occupying Power “shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order
and safety while respecting…the laws in force in the country.”11
3. Ensure and maintain public health and hygiene
“…the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of the national and local
authorities…the public health and hygiene in the occupied territory…” 12
4. Provide food and medical supplies
“…the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population…”13
5. Protect property and resources
“The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests
and agricultural estates belong to the hostile State and…it must safeguard the capital of these properties.”14
6. Permit and facilitate humanitarian relief operations
“If…the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes
on behalf of said population, and shall facilitate them…”15
7. Refrain from making changes to the institutions of the government of the occupied territory that deprive
the population of their rights
“Protected persons…shall not be deprived…of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the
result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions of government of the said territory…”16
8. In general, refrain from changing the penal laws
“The penal laws of the occupied territory will remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspend-
ed by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the
present Convention.”17
9. Refrain from selectively transferring and/or deporting persons
“Individual or mass forcible transfer, as well as, deportation of protected persons from occupied territory…are prohibit-
ed, regardless of motive.”18
9 In addition to the duties and obligations listed in the main text of this box, which are derived directly from the Hague Regulations and the Geneva
Conventions themselves, an additional important prohibition is described in the Commentary on the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Part III: Status and treatment of protected persons Section III: Occupied territories ARTI-
CLE 47 — INVIOLABILITY OF RIGHTS (1), p.275. This section states that an Occupying Power is prohibited from annexing occupied territory
absent of a peace treaty authorizing it to do so. “…the occupation of territory is essentially a temporary, de facto situation which deprive the occu-
pied Power of neither its statehood nor its sovereignty…the Occupying Power cannot therefore annex the occupied territory.”
10 Articles 27of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, articles 29, 47 and 49 are also applicable. 
11 Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations.
12 Article 56 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention.
13 Article 55 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention.
14 Articles 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. Additionally, article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states “Private property cannot be confiscated.”
15 Articles 59 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, article 61 is also applicable.
16 Article 47 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. Further, the Commentary on the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949. Part III : Status and treatment of protected persons Section III : Occupied
territories ARTICLE 47 — INVIOLABILITY OF RIGHTS (1) p.273 states  “Certain changes (to institutions) might conceivably be
necessary and even an improvement;…(the) object is to safeguard human beings and not to protect the political institutions and
government machinery of the State as such…changes made in the internal organization of the State must not lead to protected per-
sons being deprived of the rights and safeguards provided (by the Convention.)”
17 Article 64 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention.
18 Article 49 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention.
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be permitted under the provisions of humanitarian law relating to occupation. The resolution may
reasonably be interpreted to constitute Security Council endorsement of the type of fundamental
changes envisioned by the U.S. for Iraq.  
A legal debate over exactly how much latitude the U.S. should have as an occupying power to trans-
form Iraq’s institutions, and how the rights and obligations of an occupying power will interact with
the provisions in Security Council resolutions such as 1483, is likely to take place among experts and
scholars for years to come. But regardless of what those debates may conclude, the further question
about how the U.S. chooses to go about substantially transforming the country’s institutions—the
question with which the majority of this document deals—is largely a policy issue.
Legal Mandate for Previous Intervention in Iraq
Resolution 1483, having invoked Chapter VII authority, now constitutes binding international law on
Iraq. All previous Security Council resolutions on Iraq—an extensive legal framework beginning
with the lead-up to the 1991 Gulf War—are now only relevant insofar as they deal with subjects not
covered by 1483. Resolutions on topics such as sanctions and the Oil for Food program have been
largely replaced.  
Security Council resolutions constitute binding international law; they bestow legali-
ty upon the actions of nations or coalitions of nations, and contain prohibitions
which are legally binding on all states. As noted above, the legal mandates and pro-
hibitions contained within applicable past resolutions and those in Resolution 1483
may serve to expand or complicate the activities undertaken by the Authority in its
capacity as an occupying force. 
The extensive list of previous resolutions on Iraq is instructive in tracking the activi-
ties of the international community over the past decade. For example, unlike the
recent conflict in Iraq for which no additional Security Council authorization was
obtained, the 1991 Gulf War was authorized by S.C. Resolution 678 on November
29, 1990. In addition, economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime and the
UN-led Oil for Food Program were both governed by extensive sets of Security
Council resolutions. A comprehensive list of Security Council resolutions on Iraq,
starting from the Gulf War, is included in Appendix 2 on page 65. The resolutions
are divided into three topics: Disarmament and Inspections; Oil for Food; and
Economic Sanctions. 















President George W. Bush,
Azores, March 16, 2003:
“To achieve [a unified and
democratic Iraq], we will
work closely with the inter-
national community, includ-
ing the United Nations and
our coalition partners. If mil-
itary force is required, we’ll
quickly seek new Security
Council resolutions to
encourage broad participa-
tion in the process of help-
ing the Iraqi people to build
a free Iraq.”









U.S. PLANNING FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION
On May 2, 2003, the Bush administration announced that with the end of major combat operations in
Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, III, a career diplomat, would become special envoy to the President and would
serve as the new civil administrator. Bremer arrived in Iraq on May 12, 2003 and will replace retired
Lt. Gen. Jay Garner as the head of U.S. reconstruction activities in Iraq. Unlike Garner, who had
reported to the Secretary of Defense through a military chain of command, Bremer reports directly to
the Secretary of Defense and, ultimately, to the President. As such, the shift can be characterized as a
transition from military to civilian control, but command over Iraqi reconstruction is still housed in
the Department of Defense. 
Garner was originally dispatched to Iraq to head the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA), which had been created by President Bush in January 2003 in anticipation of the war
with Iraq. ORHA is housed within the Department of Defense and was meant to be the central post-war
planning office for the U.S. Originally its leadership, held by Garner, reported to Central Commander
Tommy Franks, who in turn reported to the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.19 ORHA was charged
with developing detailed plans for all aspects of planning for the administration of post-war Iraq, and was
to coordinate participation of UN agencies, NGOs and
other branches of the U.S. government. 
The office filled a notable pre-existing gap within the
U.S. government of a coordinating mechanism for
interagency reconstruction activities. Under the
Clinton administration, a plan for devising and coor-
dinating reconstruction activities had been created
through Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) #56
and partly implemented, but PDD #56 was not carried
forward by the Bush administration and plans for a
replacement agency never came to fruition. Thus,
ORHA represented a significant though still vaguely
defined step.
Significant confusion remains over Bremer’s ongoing
role and the future of ORHA. In addition to the depar-
ture of Garner, three other top officials of ORHA were
removed from their posts in May 2003. These issues
bespeak larger tensions around the division of labor
and authority for reconstruction between branches of
the Executive. As it was originally publicized, ORHA’s
U.S. PLANNING FOR RECONSTRUCTION
Highlights:
 Only weeks after retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner arrived in
Baghdad to head U.S. reconstruction efforts, the Bush
administration announced that Garner would be
replaced by L. Paul Bremer, III, a career diplomat. Bremer
arrived in Iraq on May 12. 
 The shift in leadership can be characterized as a transition
from military to civilian control, but the line of command
for reconstruction remains housed in the Department of
Defense. The appointment of Bremer as the new civil
administrator of Iraq allayed some concerns about the
dominant role of the military in post-war relief efforts. 
 The confusion over Bremer’s role and the future of the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA) bespeak larger tensions within the Executive
branch, in particular between the Department of Defense
and the State Department.
19 General Tommy Franks announced on May 22, 2003 that he will retire from active military service and step down
as commander of U.S. Central Command by the end of summer 2003. Vernon Loeb, “Franks to: Leave Central
Command and Retire,” The Washington Post, May 23, 2003.  
responsibilities were to be divided into three main categories: reconstruction, civil administration, and
humanitarian assistance. The office was meant to coordinate the participation of other U.S. agencies
according to their areas of expertise, including the State Department, the Treasury Department and the
Justice Department.20 Yet it was always somewhat unclear, even after USAID began issuing contracts with
the consent of ORHA, exactly how the participation of each department would mesh. In general, the
Pentagon’s extensive control over relief efforts—and postwar reconstruction generally—has caused ten-
sion with some Executive branches, most notably with the State Department. The transfer of power from
Garner to Bremer has been characterized in some media reports as a concession to the State Department.
Even before the war in Iraq began, the State Department had begun shaping its own vision for a free
Iraq. Through its “Future of Iraq Project,” which began in October 2002, the State Department
brought together Iraqi professionals outside Iraq to examine vital humanitarian, political and econom-
ic issues facing a post-Saddam Iraq. The participants’ 17 working groups culminated in a 32-page
report, which offers an intensive analysis of what 12 of the Iraqi participants view as crucial steps in
promoting a positive future for the Iraqi people. In the report, participants examine democratic insti-
tution-building in Iraq; infrastructure needs; building a modern economy; humanitarian aid, and
other issues. The State Department says that many of the participating Iraqi professionals plan to
return to Iraq now that Saddam has been deposed, and the hope is that the “Future of Iraq Project”
recommendations can play a key role in shaping post-war institutions and reconstruction based on
Iraqi expertise. Coordination between this mechanism and the concurrent efforts being undertaken by
the Pentagon remains uncertain. 









20 For further information about ORHA’s responsibilities and structures, see U.S. Department of Defense Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance Organizational Diagram, http://www.cfr.org/pdf/chart.pdf.













TRADITIONAL ACTORS IN POST-
CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
While the U.S. has developed post-war plans for Iraq and made clear that it intends to take the lead
in rebuilding efforts, it remains unclear exactly who will administer and implement different aspects of
relief and reconstruction.21 There exists an array of national, transnational, and non-governmental
actors, all with unique capacities and expertise. Any or all of them may be called upon to participate
in reconstruction activities in Iraq and in future post-conflict situations. 
Following is a list of four types of actors that have traditionally been involved in the aftermath of con-
flict situations: the UN and its various agencies; international financial institutions (IFIs); non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), both domestic and international; and permanent and temporary securi-
ty and peacekeeping alliances.
The United Nations System
Both the United States and United Nations are con-
ducting reconstruction activities in Iraq. The United
Nations is already providing humanitarian assistance
in Iraq under various UN mandates that permit imme-
diate humanitarian assistance in disaster situations.22
Though it remained unclear for some time what the
division of labor would be between the U.S. and the
UN or which entity would ultimately coordinate the
reconstruction of Iraq, Resolution 1483 has granted a
more significant but limited role for the UN alongside
the occupying powers. In addition to the humanitari-
an activities that have proceeded throughout the
reconstruction, Resolution 1483 now provides for the
appointment of an independent Special Representative
to the Secretary General. On May 23, 2003, Secretary
General Annan named UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello as his new
Special Representative for Iraq for an initial period of
four months.23
Depending on the U.S. interpretation of the resolution
and on how Secretary General Annan chooses to pro-
ceed, the Special Representative may be able to
assume a significant role in certain activities such as
rewriting the legal codes and helping to establish an
interim government, and will govern the range of UN
activities and the commitment of UN resources in
TRADITIONAL ACTORS IN 
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
Highlights:
 Actors traditionally involved in post-conflict reconstruc-
tion efforts include the UN system, international financial
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and
regional and ad-hoc security alliances.
 Resolution 1483 has granted a significant but limited role
for the UN alongside the occupying powers; in addition
to the UN’s role in humanitarian activities, Resolution
1483 provides for an independent Special Representative
to the Secretary General. 
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank stand to play an important role in re-building post-
conflict Iraq, and will be integrally involved in the assess-
ment and restructuring of Iraq’s debt. 
 The role of NGOs in Iraq may be less than is typical in
post-crisis settings; while the U.S. Agency for International
Development is granting contracts for NGOs for security
and humanitarian purposes, most work has thus far been
contracted by the U.S. to private vendors.
 It remains unclear whether NATO will formally deploy its
own Iraq peacekeeping force in the future and if it will
seek a UN mandate beyond the provisions of Resolution
1483 to do so. 
21 Resolution 1483 does clarify certain rules and responsibilities for both the UN and the Authority, but the ultimate
authority for most areas of reconstruction, with the exception of control of oil, remains ambiguous. 
22 Most important among these are Security Council resolution 986 and resolutions 45/100 and 46/182 of the
General Assembly, UN Security Council Resolution 986, available online at:
http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm. Resolution 45/100 can be found at:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r100.htm; Resolution 46/182 can be found at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm.
23 Vieira de Mello was the preferred candidate of the U.S. Secretary General Annan had been originally hesitant to appoint
him because he did not wish to de-prioritize human rights, but eventually acceded to the request for a period of at least
four months. Colum Lynch, “Diplomat Will Oversee UN’s Iraq Operations,” The Washington Post, May 23, 2003. 
Iraq. The Special Representative is the highest UN authority on the ground and will serve as the pri-
mary liaison to the occupying powers on issues of vital importance to the international community.
The presence of the Special Representative carries with it the legitimacy of the UN member body,
which will likely encourage greater donor support to reconstruction efforts. 
The resolution also permits the UN to provide representation in such bodies as the International
Advisory and Monitoring Board for the Development Fund for Iraq (which will contain all oil revenue
and is meant to finance reconstruction activities); to “work with” the people of Iraq and with the help
of the Authority in the efforts to establish an interim government and a future representative govern-
ment; and to report to the Security Council on its activities as defined under the resolution. However,
in most of these activities it remains ambiguous which entity has the lead role in coordinating and
controlling the reconstruction. One notable exception is in the disbursement of oil revenue, where the
Authority has retained control; the resolution also mandates that the Secretary General hand over
operational control and all resources of the Oil for Food program to the Authority. 
The dominant control of the U.S., as has been noted, makes current reconstruction in Iraq diverge
widely from similar post-conflict situations in recent decades. The authorizing and legitimating power
that the United Nations may bring to reconstruction activities has remained largely untapped except
in the humanitarian sphere, as has its expansive expertise ranging from oversight and coordination to
building systems of law and reconciliation. As a report issued by the United Nations Association of
America states,
This is a fundamentally new situation for both the U.S. and the UN in many ways but the sit-
uation still reflects the realities of the past 50 years. The U.S. has overwhelming power but
must seek legitimacy through alliances and high purpose. The UN has no power except for
that bestowed upon it by its major member states, but it has great capacity to bestow legiti-
macy. There should and will be a coming together of these different roles in rebuilding Iraq.24
Many agencies of the UN system are well-positioned to assist in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts
in Iraq. Indeed, agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Office for
Project Services (UNOPS), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the
United Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF) are already actively engaged in assisting
the citizens of Iraq. These humanitarian agencies were active in Iraq before and after
the recent conflict period, and their presence preceded the passage of Resolution
1483. The efforts they administer are not considered reconstruction activities and
thus need no further mandate; in addition, these agencies were also specifically
deployed under existing Security Council mandates to provide aid in Iraq. In gener-
al, these agencies (e.g. UNHCR, WHO, WFP, UNICEF) can operate without a
Security Council resolution in order to fulfill their humanitarian missions. They
require only an invitation from the occupying force and a permissive environment in
which to operate. 
Other agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), cannot under-
take missions without a Security Council mandate authorizing operations. However,
non-humanitarian agencies do not require individual mandates after the Security
Council passes a resolution on reconstruction. In such a case, UN agencies are
deployed as necessary under the oversight of the UN Secretary General. Under the
24 United Nations Association of the United States of America, “Rebuilding Iraq: How the United States and the
United Nations Can Work Together,” April 2003, p. 4.













Joint Statement on Iraq by
U.S. President George W.
Bush and UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair, Northern
Ireland, April 8, 2003:
“The United Nations has a
vital role to play in the
reconstruction of Iraq. We
welcome the efforts of UN
agencies and non-govern-
mental organizations in pro-
viding immediate assistance
to the people of Iraq.”
terms of Resolution 1483, it appears that the Special Representative of the Secretary General may now
deploy any agency, humanitarian or otherwise, in Iraq as he sees fit. 
The UN Compensation Commission (UNCC), a subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council, will also
figure into post-conflict reconstruction plans for Iraq. The UNCC was established in 1991 by Security
Council Resolution 692 (May 20, 1991) to process claims and pay compensation for losses and dam-
age suffered as a direct result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. When the Oil for
Food program was formally launched in 1996, the UNCC began to receive 30 percent of the proceeds
of Iraq’s oil sales; this was reduced to 25 percent in 2000 by resolution 1330. Since 1991, the UNCC
has received approximately 2.6 million claims seeking compensation in excess of $300 billion.
According to the UNCC, more than 99 percent of the claims filed have been resolved, and as of April
9, 2003 the UNCC had paid more than $17 billion in claims.25 Security Council Resolution 1483
reduced the allocation to the UNCC from Iraqi oil revenue to 5 percent.
An additional UN-mandated office that will have a role in reconstructing Iraq is the High-Level
Coordinator for the return of missing property and missing persons from Iraq to Kuwait.26 The coordi-
nator is to report to every four months on Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under Security Council
Resolution 687 (1991) to repatriate or return the remains of the missing, and every six months on its
obligations to return looted property. In October 2002, Iraq began returning, through UN auspices, the
Kuwaiti archives removed by its forces during the 1990 occupation of Kuwait, but despite repeated
pledges of cooperation, the UN Security Council has expressed concern about the fate of missing per-
sons in Iraq. Resolution 1483 continues these efforts to return missing Kuwaiti nationals and property.
Following is list of relevant UN agencies, some of which are already engaged in Iraq and others which
are likely to be deployed by the new Special Representative for Iraq:
UN Humanitarian Agencies 
OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) is the office responsible for the coordina-
tion and oversight of all UN agency operations in a country or region. OCHA is charged with coordi-
nating all UN humanitarian and relief efforts in Iraq, and is also the primary point of contact between
the UN and the coalition. OCHA, which is currently operating from its Geneva headquarters, is also
instrumental in implementing the Consolidated Appeals Process, a fundraising method that the UN
system, international organizations and NGOs use to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies.
http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) provides international protection to
refugees, furnishes them with material assistance, and seeks durable solutions to their plight. UNHCR’s
role will be circumscribed by the relatively low numbers of displaced persons created by the war,
although it will be instrumental in repatriating the refugees that existed prior to the latest conflict in Iraq.  
http://www.unhcr.ch
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) is the lead agency in all matters relating to the rights and
welfare of children. UNICEF provides emergency assistance to children in war ravaged countries, and
will work with NGOs in Iraq on medical, educational and health programs that can provide for the
long-term needs of children and mothers.  
http://www.unicef.org
25 The United Nations Compensation Commission Secretariat, “Status of Claims Processing,” April 9, 2003,
http://unog.ch/uncc/status.htm.
26 On February 14, 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1284,
appointed Yuli Voronstov as his High-level Coordinator for the return of missing Kuwaiti property and persons.













WFP (World Food Program) is currently one of the only UN agencies operating on the ground in
Iraq, providing food aid to citizens in cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition. Between the months of
June and November 2003, the WFP plans to contribute more than $1.8 billion in food to Iraq, much
of which has already arrived in neighboring countries but remains outside of the borders due to secu-
rity problems and unrest within the country.27 The WFP’s mission is to provide food aid to low-
income, food-deficit countries, to help meet humanitarian relief needs and implement long-term eco-
nomic and social development projects.  
http://www.wfp.org
WHO (World Health Organization). The WHO, which undertakes preventive and reactive missions
to provide health care, will likely be engaged in many activities in Iraq, including the rehabilitation of
hospitals and local medical facilities, health education and the provision of medical care, and preven-
tative services in the early phases of reconstruction in Iraq.
http://www.who.int/en
Other UN Agencies 
UNDP (United Nations Development Program), which helps countries in their efforts to achieve sus-
tainable human development, generally plays the largest role of all UN agencies in reconstruction
efforts. In Iraq, UNDP could be tasked with missions ranging from rebuilding of the physical infra-
structure to capacity-building for local governance. UNDP—which operates in 166 nations—assists
countries in implementing programs to eradicate poverty, create employment and sustainable liveli-
hoods, empower women, and protect the environment.
http://www.undp.org
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) could be instrumental in Iraq by helping to reestablish
agricultural markets and providing indigenous farmers with the resources necessary to resume farm
operations, while also attempting to stabilize commodity prices. The FAO is tasked with promoting
efforts to raise the levels of nutrition and standards of living by helping improve the production and
distribution of food and agricultural products.
http://www.fao.org
UNDPKO (United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations) has conducted 55 peace mis-
sions since 1948. UNDPKO could be engaged in Iraq to assist the U.S.-led coalition with providing
internal security and police forces, though the U.S. has organized security in Iraq largely through
bilateral dealings.
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko
UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) efforts in Iraq would obviously center on
the rights of women and could help to ensure their inclusion in the new government. UNIFEM could
also assist in rehabilitating the educational system and developing a more representative curriculum.
UNIFEM’s mandate is to provide financial and technical assistance to innovative programs and strate-
gies that promote women’s human rights, political participation and economic security. 
http://www.unifem.org
27 Beth Potter, “WFP Announces Plan to Deliver $1.8 Billion in Food Aid,” UN Wire, May 11, 2003. 













UNEP (United Nations Environment Program) could be engaged in missions in Iraq such as rehabili-
tation of areas affected by oil well fires, as well other regional environmental concerns. UNEP works
worldwide to provide leadership and encourage partnerships that balance quality of life and environ-
mental protection. 
http://www.unep.org
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), which promotes edu-
cational, scientific and cultural collaboration, will be engaged in Iraq on efforts to help rebuild the
educational system and to provide for the preservation and continuation of religious and cultural
institutions and practices. For further information on UNESCO’s activities in relation to restoring loot-
ed artifacts, please see pages 39-40.
http://www.unesco.org
UNMAS (United Nations Mine Action Service) is preparing an emergency response team to survey
and clear landmines and UXO. UNMAS will survey and clear mines and unexploded ordnance to
make access routes and infrastructure safe; provide support for the search and removal of booby traps
and other improvised explosive devices; undertake UXO awareness training with the local population;
and offer assistance to victims.  UNMAS provides expert technical assistance in landmine identifica-
tion, removal, and destruction activities.
http://www.mineaction.org
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), which provides assistance to countries to help address
reproductive health and population issues, could resume its pre-war efforts in Iraq to ensure the avail-
ability of care and supplies for reproductive health. UNFPA has been active in Iraq since 1972, and
between 1995 and 2001 increased the number of facilities providing reproductive health services from
37 to 146.28
http://www.unfpa.org
UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services) provides project management, financial supervi-
sion, and other support services for projects and programs undertaken by UN organizations and
member states. In Iraq, UNOPS could provide services to a wide range of post-conflict projects.
http://www.unops.org
International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are specialized agencies of the United
Nations system, set up in 1945 to help promote growth and stability in the world economy. They
stand to play an important role in re-building post-war Iraq, especially in the absence of a functional
regional development bank in the Middle East. In addition to their activities relating to debt restruc-
turing and economic rehabilitation of Iraq, an additional role for the IFIs has been conferred by the
terms of Security Council Resolution 1483, which states that representatives of the IMF and the World
Bank will sit on the advisory and monitoring board of a “Development Fund for Iraq.” The function of
the Fund is to finance reconstruction by disbursing profits from oil exports and other revenue.
28 United Nations Population Fund, “Aid to Iraqi Women” Fact Sheet,
http://www.unfpa.org/emergencies/iraq/index.htm.














It is still somewhat unclear in what
forum Iraq’s debt will be addressed, but
Iraq is not expected to begin repayment
of debts until after 2004.32 Resolution
1483 “calls upon the international finan-
cial institutions to assist the people of
Iraq” and further welcomes efforts by
the Paris Club, an informal group of
sovereign creditors, to “seek a solution
to Iraq’s sovereign debt problems.” At
their annual meeting on April 13, 2003,
the World Bank and IMF invited the
Paris Club take up the issue of Iraq’s
debt.33 Before any debt restructuring or
servicing will take place, all parties agree
that an official number for the extent of
Iraqi debt will have to be reached. Some
reports indicate that the IMF will take
the lead on providing this figure, but the
Paris Club has also indicated that it will
assess Iraqi debt as the first step in its
continuing efforts. It seems clear that
either one of the two bodies, or some
combination of both, will be called
upon to assess Iraqi debt. 
The IMF and the World Bank are con-
strained somewhat by their own rules,
which state that before new funds can
be disbursed to Iraq, Baghdad must
repay the World Bank $82 million in
arrears, and the IMF $52 million in
arrears.34 While Iraq’s financial obliga-
tions to the IFIs total approximately
$134 million, it is actually govern-
ments and commercial groups that
constitute Iraq’s primary creditors,
with outstanding debts to these entities
valued at approximately $126.9 bil-
lion.35 Though the IMF and World
Bank may not be able to immediately
provide new funds to Iraq, they are













The Oil for Food Program, Past and Future
A unique UN effort in Iraq is the Oil for Food program, which is a human-
itarian initiative, not a standing agency, and has been created and gov-
erned by various Security Council resolutions. Prior to the recent conflict,
60 percent of Iraq’s civilian population was dependent on the program’s
network of more than 45,000 Iraqi food agents, who distributed food
and basic supplies such as medicine.29 Under Resolution 1483, Oil for Food
will be dismantled within six months by the Secretary General and its
funds will be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq, a replace-
ment regime for collecting and disbursing oil revenue. The Fund will dis-
burse funds and collect revenue under the direction of the Authority, in
conjunction with an International Advisory and Monitoring Board that
reports back to the Security Council. The Board is comprised of represen-
tatives from other member-based organizations such as the IMF and the
World Bank. In the immediate term, the Secretary General is instructed to
transfer $1 billion of unencumbered funds from the UN Oil for Food
escrow account into the Development Fund for Iraq. 
The Oil for Food program, proposed by the United Nations in 1991 and
established by Security Council Resolution 986 in April 1995, was created
to authorize an exception to the international economic sanctions regime
that prevented Iraq from exporting goods or resources.30 Under its aus-
pices, Iraq has been permitted to sell oil in exchange for importing
humanitarian goods through a UN escrow account. The UN has adminis-
tered the Oil for Food program through the Office of the Iraq Program. 
Oil for Food was active in Iraq right up until the conflict, when on March
17 Secretary General Annan ordered the withdrawal of UN humanitarian
personnel and an additional Security Council resolution was passed to
add flexibility, allow the urgent review of approved contracts to deter-
mine priorities for delivery of supplies, and relocate authority for the pro-
gram to the UN rather than the Iraqi government. Under the terms of
Resolution 1483, the Secretary General is now charged with assessing the
value of existing contracts and deciding which outstanding contracts to
honor and which to postpone. 
Supplies provided by the Oil for Food program are still in sharp demand.
The UN Office of the Iraq Program has stated that as of May 13, 2003,
the total value of priority items from the Oil for Food program’s humani-
tarian pipeline that can be shipped to Iraq by June 3 has reached $778
million. Most of these supplies are in the sectors of food ($356 million),
electricity ($179 million), agriculture ($119 million) and health ($81 mil-
lion). More than half (55 percent) of those goods and supplies are
already in transit to Iraq.31 In six months time, under the terms of
Resolution 1483, the Authority is expected to assume all operational
responsibility for the program, but it remains unclear how or whether
food distribution will continue at that point in time. 
29 CBS News, “Oil for Food For Iraq Gets UN OK,” March 28, 2003.
30 The sanctions, except for those prohibiting the sales of weapons, have all been lifted by Resolution 1483. See also
United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, “Oil for Food In Brief,”
http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/index.html.
31 United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, “Weekly Update: Medicines, Food and Heavy Equipment Among
Priority Items in Transit to Iraq,” May 13, 2003, http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/latest/wu030513.html .
32 Reports on May 27 indicated that the Group of 8 (G8) made preliminary agreements to impose a moratorium on
repayment of Iraqi debt through 2004. See Kathleen Ridolfo, “G-8 Reportedly Set to Grant Moratorium on Iraq’s
Foreign Debt,” Iraq Report: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 23, 2003. http://www.rferl.org/iraq-report/ Also
based on comments by Undersecretary of the Treasury, John Snow, from a mid-May meeting of finance ministers in
Deauville, France. Ed Crooks, “International Economy: Ministers Agree Iraq Needs more Time to Service Debt,”
Financial Times (FT.com), May 19, 2003. 
likely to become engaged—and in some
cases have already become involved, as men-
tioned above—in other activities relating to
economic reconstruction.
Future Role of the World Bank and
IMF in Iraq
The World Bank, originally created to finance
post-World War II reconstruction, will be
called on to finance investments in health,
education and infrastructure in Iraq. The
World Bank announced on May 28, 2003 that
it would send a Bank representative along with
the newly appointed U.N. Special
Representative on his trip to Iraq, in order to
assess the on-the-ground needs for develop-
ment and reconstruction. A full assessment
mission will not take place until security
improves, however.37 The Bank said in an earli-
er statement that it would work closely with
bilateral and multilateral groups, “particularly
United Nations agencies.”38
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) will
be needed to help re-establish Iraq’s monetary
and banking system, and may eventually be
called upon to provide temporary financial
assistance as part of a restructuring of Iraq’s
huge foreign debts. According to some
reports, IMF experts have also been working
since April 2003 to develop plans for an Iraqi
currency and ways to re-establish commerce
in the country. The IMF will also likely be
involved in assessing the total amount of Iraq’s
debt so that restructuring programs may com-
mence, as noted above. 
Bush administration officials have said they













UN Involvement in Pre-Conflict Iraq
On March 17, 2003, just before the bombing began, UN agencies
and their staff operating in Iraq were evacuated on an order from
Secretary General Annan. The UN had been active in providing
basic services in Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War and its agencies have
amassed expertise and contracts throughout the country.
 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was the
lead UN agency on the ground and managed the Oil for Food
program. The main UNDP effort in Iraq was the reconstruction
of the power grid in Baghdad, and the development of infra-
structure in northern Iraq, especially in the Kurdish sectors. In
addition, UNDP worked to support some civil society activities
including health care, microfinance, and promotion of women’s
rights. UNDP also supported the Learning Resource Center, which
gave Iraqis training in information technology and access to the
outside world through an informal internet café.  
 The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)
operated in Iraq and at its borders. The first Gulf War produced a
large caseload of nearly one million internally displaced persons
(IDPs) who have not yet been resettled.
 UNICEF worked on specific child health care issues, providing
help to women and children throughout the sanctions era.
 The World Food Program provided food and other supplies to
support the 60 percent of the population that relied on humani-
tarian food assistance.
 In addition, the UN had provided a Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Iraq, as established by the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights at its 1991 session and
renewed annually since then. The mandate of the Special
Rapporteur is to investigate concerns in countries and receive
and consider complaints from victims of human rights violations,
and then reports his findings, conclusions and recommendations
to the Commission or the United Nations General Assembly. In
February 2002, the Special Rapporteur for Iraq was granted per-
mission by the Iraqi government to visit the country for the first
time in ten years. A second trip was being planned before the
outbreak of the recent conflict.36
33 The Paris Club itself is owed money by Iraq. Pyivi Munter, “War in Iraq After the Conflict: Baghdad Action Triggers
Rally in Traded Debt,” Financial Times (FT.com), April 8, 2003. 
34 World Bank, “Spring Meeting 2003 Press Release,” , April 22, 2003, http://www.worldbank.org and International
Monetary Fund, “Spring Meeting 2003 Press Release,” April 22, 2003.
35 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq
Supplement I: Background Information on Iraq’s Financial Obligations,” January 23, 2003, p. 3, figure 3. Based on
the report’s figure of $127 billion for Iraq’s foreign debt, and subtracting the IMF and World Bank’s arrears of $134
million, the total remaining foreign debt after repaying these two IFIs is $126,866,000,000.
36 In his remarks to the Commission on April 1, 2003 the current Rapporteur, Andreas Mavrommatis, stressed the
importance of continuing his activities and the activities of the Commission in Iraq “to assist [Iraqis] in the process
of the healing of wounds, in tackling humanitarian issues that arise, in protecting at all times the supreme right to
life, and eventually in ensuring for the future the effective application of civil, political, economic, social and cul-
tural rights.” Introductory Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Andreas
Mavrommatis, 59th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, April 1, 2003.
37 World Bank, “Assessing Needs in Iraq,” May 28, 2003, http://www.worldbank.org.
38 World Bank, “Official Statement,” April 29, 2003, http://www.worldbank.org.
would welcome World Bank and IMF help in Iraq and provided a limited role for the
IFIs in Security Council Resolution 1483, but it remains unclear how such efforts
would be reconciled with U.S. projects, such as those to be undertaken by the U.S.
Agency for International Development. Traditionally, the World Bank has provided
immediate economic assessments, often in cooperation with USAID, to determine
strategies for financing the recovery effort. 
However, in a confidential 100-page U.S. contracting document entitled “Moving the
Iraqi Economy From Recovery to Sustainable Growth,” obtained by a Wall Street
Journal reporter, U.S. officials contemplate in detail restructuring an economy that has
been almost entirely government-run for decades, and long mired in a slump aggravat-
ed by wars and international sanctions.39 The report, prepared by the Treasury
Department and the Agency for International Development (USAID), envisions a dom-
inant role for private American contractors working alongside small teams of U.S. offi-
cials, and mentions the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund only in
passing. Treasury Department officials maintain that the plan reflects only a general
vision for Iraq’s future economy, and that not all the goals will necessarily be followed.
U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow said in late April that the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund will play an “important role in supporting” reconstruction of Iraq.40 Snow noted that the Bank was
establishing expert teams to conduct a needs assessment and that the IMF “has provided general advice
on the currency and monetary policy, and has also signaled that it is prepared to undertake a needs
assessment at the appropriate time.”41 The IMF has not yet sent a team into Iraq for this work and a
spokesman noted on May 22 that it would do so at such time as seemed “useful and productive.”42
Other International Financial Institutions in Reconstruction
There is currently no Middle East Development Bank akin to reconstruction and development banks
in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. In 1995, President Clinton convened a group of
European and other national delegations to consider the creation of such an institution. In 1996, the
Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA-
BANK) was created, but it endured many problems related to the Israeli-Arab conflict, and is now in
a state of collapse. 
Finally, the European Union (EU) can also act as an IFI. In times of crisis, the EU has the ability to
disburse funding from a pool of resources that is received from individual member nations. The EU
has been involved in humanitarian assistance in Iraq through the European Commission
Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). ECHO supplies technical assistance and funding to UN agencies
and NGOs operating in Iraq. Between the Gulf War of 1991 and the most recent conflict, ECHO was
the main source of external humanitarian assistance for the Iraqi people. ECHO has pledged 327 mil-
lion Euros for post-conflict relief efforts in Iraq, primarily through OCHA, UNICEF, CARE (a U.S.-
based relief NGO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (see page 18 for more information
on the ICRC), and Première Urgence (an international humanitarian aid agency).43













Edwin Truman, a former
top international finance
official at the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury
Department:
‘’This will not be credible to
the Iraqi people or anyone
else if we try to do it our-
selves. The World Bank and
the IMF have a lot more
experience and a lot more
credibility in this than the
U.S. government.”
39 Neil King, “US envisions a free-market revolution,” The Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2003.
40 Reuters, “U.S. Treasury’s Snow: IMF, World Bank to Help in Iraq,” April 30, 2003. Also see: Paul Blustein, “G-7
Agrees That Iraq Needs Help With Debt; Important Roles Seen For IMF, World Bank,” The Washington Post, April
13, 2003.
41 Testimony of Undersecretary of the Treasury John Snow, U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Foreign
Operations Subcommittee, April 30, 2003.  
42 Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations Department of the IMF, “Press Briefing,” May 22, 2003,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2003/tr030522.htm.
43 Agence France Presse, “EU announces 327 million euros for Iraq relief operations,” March 31, 2003.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
NGOs play an important role in emergency reconstruction efforts, and they also represent the core
suppliers of medium- and long-term assistance efforts on the ground.
Mandate, Activities and Capacity
NGOs engage in post-war reconstruction using funds raised from the public and/or as the implement-
ing partners for bilateral donors and United Nations agencies from which they receive funding. Thus,
while UN agencies or donor governments may direct and fund the reconstruction efforts, NGOs are
often largely responsible for on-the-ground planning and physical execution of rebuilding.
In the short-term, NGOs provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by conflict in the forms of
food, water, health care, and shelter. Some prominent groups which have been instrumental in past
post-conflict relief efforts include CARE, Catholic Relief
Services and World Vision, which are leaders in food
distribution. The International Rescue Committee (a
refugee relief agency) and Oxfam are acknowledged
leaders in water and sanitation.44 Medecins Sans
Frontières (the French-based NGO) and International
Medical Corps (a global humanitarian organization)
provide clinical medical services at disaster sites. In the
longer-term, as implementing partners for donor
nations and UN agencies, NGO activities span a broad
spectrum of sectors, including education, agriculture,
health, small business, and civil society.
NGOs tend to have unique capacities in post-con-
flict situations. They typically have greater knowl-
edge of local conditions than UN agencies or bilat-
eral donors because their personnel have been on
the ground for years, or sometimes decades, as in
the cases of Afghanistan and Sudan. Their institu-
tional memories are better and their individual rela-
tionships more intimate. 
Another unique feature of on-the-ground assistance by NGOs is their explicit non-alignment with either
side of a conflict; groups engaged in humanitarian assistance subscribe to principles of independence
and impartiality which give them some protection from attack amidst conflict and residual violence.
Potential Conflicts of Interest in Iraq
Their principled impartiality has led to great concern on the part of NGOs working on the ground in
Iraq that they not be perceived as taking orders from the U.S. military. Yet NGOs, for the most part,
also acknowledge that coordination with the military in conflict situations is necessary for success.
The military can be wary of joining forces with NGOs as well, due in part to vastly different organiza-
tional structures between the two entities, but often recognizes that aid workers have years of experi-
ence and can offer an invaluable understanding of the situation on the ground. 
44 The ICRC is an international organization, not an NGO. See the pull-out box on the ICRC above.
45 Portions excerpted directly from the International Committee of the Red Cross, “Discover the ICRC,” May 2002,
http://www.icrc.org/WEBGRAPH.NSF/Graphics/discover_eng.pdf/$FILE/discover_eng.pdf. For more information
on the ICRC’s activities, please see http://www.icrc.org.
46 Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army “Play to Win: Final Report of
the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” January 2003.













International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)45
The ICRC, founded in 1863, is unique among non-govern-
mental and international organizations. Its mandate to
protect and assist the victims of armed conflict was con-
ferred by the international community through the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional
Protocols of 1977. The ICRC’s guiding principle is that even
in war there are limits: limits on how warfare is conducted
and limits on how combatants behave. The set of rules
related to conduct during military operations is known as
international humanitarian law (IHL), of which the Geneva
Conventions and the Hague Conventions of 1907, are the
most important instruments. The ICRC, as the explicit
guardian of IHL, spreads knowledge of that law and pro-
motes its development. The ICRC also works to protect
and assist people in the midst of conflict and other
humanitarian crisis, working closely with Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies worldwide. 
Interaction, a Washington-based coalition of humanitarian groups, was negotiating with U.S. military
planners for months prior to the war on the logistics of working together in Iraq, while also advocat-
ing that humanitarian agencies should operate under civilian control. There have also been past efforts
to foster cooperation; a notable example was the year-long Commission on Post-Conflict
Reconstruction, which met throughout 2002 and included members of NGOs and military leaders.
The group ultimately issued a set of recommendations, including greater standardization and institu-
tionalization of the role of NGOs in the U.S. government’s planning process for post-conflict recon-
struction.46 It seems clear that the success of reconstruction efforts in Iraq will depend, in part, on the
ability of the two sectors to cooperate. 
Activities in Iraq 
For a number of reasons, some explained above, the role of NGOs in Iraq may be less than is typical in
post-crisis settings. While the U.S. Agency for International Development is granting contracts for NGOs
for security and humanitarian purposes, most work thus far has been contracted by the U.S. to private
vendors. NGO involvement is likely to be more indirect, with groups applying for community develop-
ment grants or becoming subcontractors to firms in need of specialized knowledge. Additionally, cooper-
ation between NGOs and the U.S. government in Iraq has been impeded because for many months lead-
ing up to the conflict, the U.S. significantly delayed issuing to NGOs the necessary licensing require-
ments mandated under the economic sanctions regime. As a result, many groups were unable to do pre-
conflict assessments and preparations, and have had trouble deploying immediately on the ground.
The few international NGOs that were in Iraq before the war and remained through the conflict – e.g.
CARE Australia and Save the Children/UK – are continuing their programs. Approximately 60 NGOs
were in Jordan and more in Kuwait waiting to enter Iraq at the end of the conflict.47 The chaos which
ensued after the fall of the regime and continuing armed violence slowed the entry of most. But an
increasing number of newly arrived NGOs are operational inside the country. Save the Children/U.S. and
Mercy Corps are among NGOs providing food, fuel and water in Umm Qasr and other southern cities;
International Medical Corps has been working in a Baghdad hospital; and Northwest Medical Teams
continues to provide medical assistance in northern Iraq. 
Coordination between NGOs and the U.S.-led forces in Iraq is being undertaken through the
Humanitarian Operation Center (HOC) in Kuwait. The HOC represents the civil side of the the U.S.-
led coalition. Its purpose is to facilitate humanitarian efforts through the sharing of critical informa-
tion regarding access, security and populations in need. The United States has also deployed a
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The team conducts assessments, directs assistance
towards vulnerable populations, and provides funding to International Organizations and NGOs. The
DART is composed of more than 60 humanitarian response experts from USAID; the Department of
State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration; and the Department of Health and Human
Service’s Public Health Service. In addition, the DART has the authority to provide grants on-site, and
has administrative officers for logistics, transportation, and procurement, all of which enable the team
to assess needs and fund solutions in the field.
For a complete, up-to-date list of which NGOs are in Iraq, see the Humanitarian Information Center
for Iraq (HIC), “Who’s Doing What Where” at http://www.agoodplacetostart.org/wdww.php













47 State Department briefing, April 21, 2003; Associated Press, “Relief workers in Middle East prepare for war’s
human toll,” March 14, 2003.
48 U.S. Department of State Press Conference, “Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and NATO Secretary
General Lord Robertson After Their Meeting,” May 5, 2003, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/20224.htm.
Regional Security Alliances and Ad-Hoc Temporary Alliances
Regional security alliances have traditionally been involved in post-conflict reconstruction through the
provision of peacekeeping and peace-building forces. In Iraq the U.S.-led coalition has kept the peace
thus far, but Secretary of State Colin Powell said on May 5, 2003, that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) “will explore a potential mission in Iraq in the days and weeks ahead,” and on
May 21, NATO announced that it will aid Poland in establishing a peacekeeping force in central
Iraq.48 The role will be limited in the near future to such efforts as technical assistance, but may signi-
fy a step toward direct provision of NATO forces to Iraq. For the time being, NATO’s Secretary
General, Lord Robertson, has stated that “we are not talking about a NATO presence in Iraq, we are
talking purely and simply about NATO help to Poland.”49 It remains unclear whether NATO will for-
mally deploy its own peacekeeping force in the future and if it will seek a UN mandate beyond the
provisions of Resolution 1483 to do so. Resolution 1483 extends the legal provisions on occupation to
any peacekeepers operating under the command of the Authority.
NATO was founded in 1949 to provide mutual security to Atlantic allies including the U.S., Canada,
and countries of Western Europe. In recent years, NATO has expanded its role in helping to resolve
humanitarian crises and providing security for reconstruction efforts beyond the immediate Atlantic
region. NATO receives a mandate to act when its members vote to do so. In the past, NATO has also
received mandates to act under Security Council resolutions. Since 1995, NATO has been responsible
for major peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo.50
In April 2003, NATO announced that it will expand its peacekeeping responsibilities in Afghanistan,
and will take control of the 29-nation International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that is helping
the Afghan Transitional Authority maintain security. Control of ISAF, to which NATO members have
provided 95 percent of the troops, had previously rotated among nations every six months. ISAF will,
however, continue to be a UN-mandated operation under United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1386, 1413 and 1444. NATO’s actions mark the first time the Alliance has moved beyond
the scope of its original mission and participated in such geographically remote areas. 
Another example of peacekeeping-by-alliance is for developing countries to deploy peacekeepers
under the auspices of regional alliances with larger organizational mandates. One such standing
alliance on the African continent is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
ECOWAS, an economic-based organization in West Africa since 1975, has also undertaken peace and
post-conflict operations independent of or in cooperation with the United Nations. In its relatively
short history, ECOWAS has engaged in several robust conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace
enforcement missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, under the auspices of the ECOWAS Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG forces are deployed on an ad-hoc basis, usually retroactively mandated
by a Standing Committee, and do not need the support or consent of all member states. 
In the past two decades, countries have also joined together in temporary alliances to provide peace-
keeping and security forces in post-conflict situations. One example is the Australian-led International
Force in East Timor (InterFET), which began deployment on September 20, 1999 under UN Security
Council Resolution 1264 to restore peace and security in East Timor. InterFET—which consisted of
16 countries, including the United States—comprised a total of 9,300 troops and was successful in
ending militia violence (for more information on East Timor, see page 51). 













49 Paul Ames, “NATO moves quickly, will aid Polish peacekeepers in Iraq,” Agence France Presse,May 22, 2003.
50 NATO launched its first major peacekeeping effort, Stabilization Force (SFOR), to Bosnia in December 1995 to “main-
tain the security environment necessary to enable the country to rebuild after … conflict.” SFOR operations were man-
dated under UN Security Council Resolution 1088 of December 12, 1996. (NATO Fact Sheet, “NATO’s Role in Bosnia
and Herzegovina,” May 8, 2001; NATO Handbook, “Chapter 5: The Alliance’s Operational Role in Peacekeeping:
SFOR’s Mandate.”) Following the NATO-led bombing campaign in Kosovo, NATO deployed a peacekeeping force,
KFOR, to “establish a secure environment and ensuring public safety and order.” KFOR’s mandate comes from a
Military Technical Agreement signed by NATO and Yugoslav commanders on June 9, 1999 and from UN Security
Council Resolution 1244 of June 12, 1999. (NATO Fact Sheet, “NATO’s Role in Relation to Kosovo,” August 9, 2000.)
Finally, the European Union has developed a Rapid Reaction Force. The EU will eventually be able to
deploy up to 60,000 ground troops within 60 days and maintain the presence for one year.51 The EU
defense ministers announced on May 19, 2003 that this force is ready for peacekeeping duties and
that they were considering a request from the UN to send troops to the Congo. The Rapid Reaction
Force will have three main roles: to give assistance to civilians threatened by a crisis outside the EU, to
respond to UN calls for peacekeeping forces, and to intervene between separate warring factions. In
all three scenarios the EU would deploy its forces only if NATO decides not to get involved. The EU is
also developing the capacity to rapidly deploy police, criminal investigators and judicial officials.













51 The European Union, “Guide for Americans: Europe in the World,”
http://www.eurunion.org/infores/euguide/Chapter7.htm.












ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND 
POLITICAL DIVERSITY IN IRAQ
The 24 million people of Iraq are ethnically, religiously, and politically diverse. Muslims compose 97
percent of Iraq’s population, with Shiite Muslims making up more than 65 percent of the population
and the minority Sunni Muslims more than 32 percent. The remaining 3 percent includes Christians,
Jews, and other religious sects. Ethnic Arabs dominate Iraq, making up more than 75 percent of the
population. Kurds, who are concentrated in the north of the country, make up more than 15 per-
cent, while Turkomans, Assyrians and others account for the remainder.52 In addition, a fractious
political scene encompasses both secular and religious groups from within the country as well as the
diaspora community. 
The diversity of the Iraqi population has complicated the establishment of an interim government that
will eventually lead to a permanent democratically elected government.
Ethnic Groups
Arabs
Arabs are the largest ethnic group in Iraq (more than
18 million people), and are divided mainly into Shiite
and Sunni Muslims. These groups are discussed below
(see “Religious Divisions.”)
Kurds
Concentrated in northern Iraq and divided by lan-
guage and religious sect, most Kurds are Sunni, with a
small mixture of Shiite, Christian, Kurdish-speaking
Assyrians, and Persian-speaking Kurds known as Faili
Kurds (the latter are regarded as non-Arab and non-
Iraqi). The Kurds surround the cities of Mosul and
Kirkuk, which contain Iraq’s richest oil fields. The
Kurds have been fighting for decades for independ-
ence from Turkey, Iran, and Iraq and for the establish-
ment of an independent Kurdish state. If the Kurds
were to succeed in breaking away from Iraq, one effect
would be to tilt the religious balance even more
strongly in favor of the Shiites, since the vast majority
of Kurds in Iraq are Sunnis. Despite close and long-
standing relationships with the Kurds, the U.S. has committed to preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity.
FUTURE LEADERS: ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL
DIVERSITY IN IRAQ
Highlights
 Arabs are the largest ethnic group in Iraq and are divid-
ed mainly into Shiite and Sunni Muslims. Although Shiite
Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs have
traditionally dominated economic and political life in
Iraq.
 The Kurds, most of whom are Sunni, have been fighting
for decades for independence from Turkey, Iran, and
Iraq, and for the establishment of an independent
Kurdish state. The Kurds have traditionally had close ties
with the U.S. 
 As the largest population within Iraq, many Shiites want
an Islamic government; this sentiment is especially strong
among high-level religious leaders with ties to Iran’s
Shiite government.  
 Sunnis are wary that a Shiite religious revival in Iraq
could produce pressure for the creation of an Islamic
state; many Sunnis feel uncomfortable about the
prospect of a Shiite Iraqi state.
52 Unless otherwise sourced, all statistics in this section are from the CIA World Factbook 2002,
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html.
Turkomans 
Turkomans, the third largest ethnic group in Iraq, live primarily in northern Iraq. They are Turkish-
speaking and almost all are Muslims, though a small percentage is Christian. The creation of a “safe
haven” for the Kurds in northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War effectively split the Turkomans into two
groups: those dominated by the Kurds and those dominated by the Baghdad regime. The Turkomans’
political importance stems mainly from their affinity with Turkey, which has difficulties with its own
Kurdish minority. The Turkomans of Iraq originally came from central Asia, in a migration that took
place over several hundred years, beginning in the 7th century AD.
Assyrians
Assyrians in Iraq live mostly in the north of the country. Descended from Christians, the Assyrian peo-
ple are linked to the Vatican or the Greek Orthodox Church and trace their history back to a kingdom
in northern Mesopotamia—what is now Iraq—that began around 1350 BC. At its height, the empire
controlled the Middle East from the Gulf to Egypt. Assyrians are primarily Christians.
Religious Divisions
The world’s Muslims are divided primarily into two sects—the majority Sunni (nearly 90 percent) and
the minority Shiite (10 percent).53 Both are similar in their beliefs but divided over who has the right-
ful claim to lead the Muslim people. The division dates back to the infancy of Islam, on the Arabian
Peninsula, as a political dispute over who would succeed the prophet Mohammed. The Shiite sect felt
that Mohammed’s son-in-law, Ali, and his descendants, were the rightful heirs. Ali was later named
the fourth caliph, or leader, of Islam, but was murdered after five years, causing Shiism to become a
minority sect. The larger Sunni sect did not recognize the heirs of Ali as having automatic right to be
caliph; they preferred to elect a leader. Islam also has a third, mystical component known as Sufism,
which draws followers—as well as fierce and often violent opponents—from both Shiite and Sunni
Muslims. Within the Islamic world, Baghdad is seen as the heart of Sufism.
After the death of Mohammed, the Sunnis grew into power and Shiism ultimately became a minority
sect. According to scholar Khalid Duran, however, this division in Islam is not merely a dispute over
succession: “The conflict between Sunnism and Shiism resembles that between Judaism and
Christianity…just as Christians have held Jews responsible for the killing of Christ, Shiites hold
Sunnis responsible for the killing of Ali and his sons.”54 Hence, the disputes within Islamic history are
diverse and deeply profound for the tradition’s followers.
In Iraq, the Muslim population is majority Shiite (60-65 percent) and minority Sunni (32-37 percent).
During the 400 years of the Ottoman Empire, the Sunnis in Iraq were favored by the Sunni Turkish
governors, so they gained valuable administrative experience and have dominated the Iraqi bureaucra-
cy since independence in 1932. Although Shiite Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs tra-
ditionally have dominated economic and political life in Iraq, and those holding Sunni religious
beliefs have experienced a distinct advantage in all areas of secular endeavor, including civil, political,
military, and economic realms.
53 “Islam’s beginnings and its major sects,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 2001.
54 Vartan Gregorian, “Islam:  A Mosaic, not a Monolith,” Carnegie Corporation of New York, Annual Report 2001.
[forthcoming publication in book form]












Divided by region, class, tribal affiliation, and ethnicity, the Shiite Muslims in Iraq include Arabs, Kurds, and
Turkomans. Shiites reside mostly in central and southern Iraq, which is the most productive agricultural
region and encompasses the most important oil-refining center (in Al Basrah) and the main port, Umm Qasr. 
As the largest population within Iraq, many Shiites want an Islamic government. This sentiment is
especially strong among high-level religious leaders with ties to Iran’s Shiite government. Many
Shiites, however, are strict secularists who believe in the separation of religion and state. 
Many Shiite religious leaders believe that the next leader of Iraq should be a descendant of the
Prophet Mohammed, and there are several families which claim divine rights and the right to political
leadership. Shiite leaders rise through the ranks on the basis of their scholarly mastery of Islamic law,
influence within the sect, and popularity among the people. Outspoken in the past, Shiite clerics were
targeted and murdered by Saddam Hussein’s regime. Many of today’s leaders, like Muqtada al-Sadr,
are the sons of these martyrs.55
The current supreme Shiite cleric in Iraq is the Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali al-Sestani. Al-Sestani has
rejected any “foreign rule” over Iraq, but has urged his followers not to interfere with U.S. forces and
says he will accept whatever “form of government that the Iraqi people approve of.”56
Secular and religious Shiites are trying to amass power in Iraq by filling the power vacuum left after
the overthrow of Saddam. Shiite leaders have been organizing local communities, providing humani-
tarian assistance, paying salaries to some civil servants, retrieving looted property and sending militias
to secure government buildings.
Sunni
Sunnis, who have dominated Iraqi politics since the end of World War I, reside predominantly in the
north and west of Baghdad. Sunnis comprised the vast majority of Saddam Hussein’s ruling Baath Party,
which brutally oppressed, impoverished, and disenfranchised most middle- and upper-class Shiites. 
The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 exacerbated religious animosities between Sunnis and Shiites. Sunnis
are wary that a Shiite religious revival in Iraq could produce pressure for the creation of an Islamic
state. Many Sunnis feel uncomfortable about the prospect of a Shiite Iraqi state, especially one with
close ties to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Political Groups
There are dozens of political groups in Iraq, representing a variety of religious, ethnic and political
interests. Many of these groups have organized into coalitions and are now part of the formal process
of selecting representatives for an Iraqi Interim Administration in Iraq. 
In 1998, a piece of U.S. legislation called the “Iraq Liberation Act” established two sources of financial
and material support for Iraqi opposition forces, one emanating from the Defense Department to sup-
ply defense-related training and services, and one from the Department of State to supply support
funds. Seven groups were authorized to receive this funding under the provisions of the act: Iraqi
National Congress, Iraqi National Accord, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan,57 and
Constitutional Monarchists.58
55 On April 10, 2003, Abdel Majid al-Khoei, a Shiite cleric newly returned from exile and cooperating with the
American forces, was killed by a mob at Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. Khoei supported the war in Iraq and was
backed by the U.S., which angered some Shiites hostile to invasion. (Craig S. Smith, “U.S.-Backed Shiite Cleric
Killed at Shrine in Najaf,” The New York Times, April 11, 2003.)
56 The Associated Press, “A Who’s Who of Iraqi Shiite leaders,” April 22, 2003,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-04-22-shiite-who_x.htm.
57 The group is now “almost defunct.” Based in Halabja, this organization has been supported by Saudi Arabia and
Iran in the past, and can now muster up only 1,500 fighters at most. (Ibrahim Al-Marashi, “The Iraqi Actors in the
North of Iraq,” Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation, March 27, 2003,
http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/nactors.htm.)











Following is a more comprehensive list of prominent Iraqi groups:
Coalition and Umbrella Groups
 Iraqi National Congress (INC)
The INC, founded in 1992, is an umbrella organization of Iraqi opposition groups, which has
emerged as a powerful political force with heavy U.S. backing. Headed by Ahmad Chalabi
and a group of exiles who opposed the regime of Saddam Hussein, the group has received
significant funding from the U.S. beginning in the early 1990s and then formally under the
1998 Iraq Liberation Act. The INC has been criticized for having little or no political support
inside Iraq despite being a favorite of some Bush administration officials, predominantly in
the Department of Defense.
 Iraqi National Accord (INA)
Based in Amman, Jordan, INA is composed mostly of former Iraqi military and intelligence
officers. INA networks inside Iraq were infiltrated and largely destroyed by Saddam Hussein’s
agents during the planning of a failed coup in 1996. The group is not considered to have
strong support on the ground. The INA, which was created by Saudi intelligence in 1990,
was reorganized by the CIA in 1996. INA, which is led by Iyad Allawi, has participated in
the planning meetings for an Iraqi Interim administration.
 Constitutional Monarchy Movement 
The CMM grows out of the British-backed constitutional monarchy government that ruled
Iraq from 1921 until a 1958 revolution. Leadership of this movement is based in London,
and though the CMM is a member of the Iraqi National Congress, the INC does not support
the return of the monarchy. CMM has participated in the planning meetings for an Iraqi
Interim Administration. 
National Islamist Groups
 The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
SCIRI, the major Iraqi Shiite opposition faction, is based in Tehran and led by Mohammed
Baqir al-Hakim. SCIRI is particularly strong is southern Iraq, where it has strong links to fun-
damentalist Islamists. It is estimated that SCIRI, founded with the support of Iran in 1982,
has a militia of thousands. Its leaders, however, have been criticized as unfit to lead post-con-
flict Iraq because they were in exile during the Hussein years. SCIRI’s relations with the U.S.
have been strained because of its close association with Iran. In the run-up to the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq, SCIRI moderated its calls for an Islamic republic in Iraq, and despite boy-
cotting the first meeting of Iraqi opposition groups to establish an Iraqi Interim
Administration, sent representatives to the second meeting.
58 Text of the act available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ338.105











 The Daawa Group
The Daawa Group is one of the oldest Shiite Islamist movements in Iraq, having
been established in the 1950s. It was harshly oppressed by the Baathist regime.
Daawa has not participated in the meetings to establish an Iraqi Interim
Administration but has a strong presence in Iraq, and has held talks with U.S.
officials. A spokesman said the party would consider attending subsequent meet-
ings if invited, adding, “We want a pluralistic society based on democracy and
human rights.”59
Kurdish Groups
Kurds form the largest stateless ethnic community in the Middle East today and
include large, often oppressed communities in many Middle Eastern countries. Since
the exit of U.S. troops after the Gulf War in 1991, the Kurds of Iraq have inhabited a
relatively autonomous region loosely known as Kurdistan, though its exact boundaries
are in constant dispute. Kurdistan is largely controlled by the following two opposi-
tional parties:
 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
The KDP, founded in 1946, is one of the two main Kurd opposition parties and has strong
support on the ground in Iraq. Once allied with Saddam Hussein against the rival Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan, the KDP severed ties with the former regime and built ties with the
United States, other opposition groups and former rival Kurdish forces. Led by Masoud
Barzani, the KDP enjoyed a “golden age” in the 1990s, living in the U.S.-British no-fly zone
and reaping profits by smuggling Iraqi oil into Turkey. The KDP’s militia of 40,000 worked
with U.S. forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The KDP receives funding from the U.S
under the Iraq Liberation Act and has participated in the planning meetings for an Iraqi
Interim Administration.
 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan emerged as a splinter group of the KDP in 1969. Based in
northeast Iraq, in the autonomous region bordering Iraq, the KDP is the second of the two
main Kurdish opposition parties, and has worked closely with the U.S.-led coalition, both mil-
itarily and politically, during the recent invasion of Iraq. From 1994-97, the PUK and KDP
fought over territory and oil smuggling revenues, but in 1998, with help from the INC, nego-
tiated a rapprochement. The PUK receives funding from the U.S under the Iraq Liberation Act
and has participated in the planning meetings for an Iraqi Interim Administration. 











Joint statement by U.S.
President George W. Bush
and British Prime Minister
Tony Blair, Northern
Ireland, April 8, 2003:
The [Iraqi] Interim Authority
will be broad-based and fully
representative, with members
from all of Iraq’s ethnic
groups, regions, and diaspora.
The Interim Authority will be
established first and foremost
by the Iraqi people, with the
help of the members of the
coalition, and working with
the Secretary General of the
United Nations.” 
59 James Drummond, “Da’awa voices interest in talks on interim rule,” Financial Times, April 30, 2003.
Other
 Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MKO)
The MKO, also known as the National Council of Resistance and the People’s Movement of
Iran, was originally formed in the 1960s as an armed Islamic opposition movement against
the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The MKO was excluded from power under the
subsequent religious government of Iran, and has violently opposed the present Iranian state
since 1979. Saddam Hussein was a major benefactor of the MKO, providing them with finan-
cial and logistical support and military equipment, as
well as Iraqi bases from which to wage their armed
struggle against Iran. The group was also used by
Saddam against the Iraqi population, specifically to
repress the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings after the 1991
Gulf War. The MKO has been declared a terrorist
organization by Iran, the European Union, and until
recently, the U.S. 
When U.S. planes bombed the Mujahedin’s bases at the
beginning of the 2003 Iraq war, the MKO immediately
agreed to a cease-fire with Washington, and the U.S.
military reclassified their bases as noncombatant sites.
Subsequently, the Pentagon announced a truce with the
group, presumably on the assumption that an alliance
with the MKO will facilitate U.S. efforts to secure and
stabilize Iraq. In an agreement signed on April 15, the
MKO is allowed to maintain its armed camps in Iraq,
ostensibly to defend itself against Iranian-sponsored
troops. The MKO, in return, has agreed to abstain from
hostile acts against U.S. forces and to place their offen-
sive weaponry in “non-threatening” positions.60
60 Dan De Luce, “Iran furious at ceasefire deal with terror group,” The Guardian, May 1, 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,947083,00.html.











A Council of Nine
Despite concurrent reports that Iraqi delegates would
meet in late May to select new interim leaders—a meet-
ing which has now been moved to July by Paul Bremer—
on May 5, 2003, Lt. Gen. Jay Garner announced that a
council of up to nine Iraqis would likely lead the country’s
interim government. He listed the following as probable




leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party
Jalal Talabani 




Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
As of May 8, reports stated that selection of the four
remaining leaders would be debated in closed quarters by
these five future members. 

















Establishing a transitional authority and, ultimately, a democratic government in Iraq, will constitute
the most fundamental aspect of its reconstruction and re-entry into the international community. Yet it
is also one of the most difficult aspects of any reconstruction effort, and contention has surrounded
U.S. plans for governance in Iraq, especially with respect to the processes by which indigenous actors
are being included and involved.  
The following section details the administration’s plans for the future government of Iraq; needs for
establishing a successful transition to democracy which may be unaddressed or under-emphasized by
these plans; and the UN’s current and potential role in the governance process.
Administration Plans and Actions
U.S. plans for the transition to a democratic govern-
ment in Iraq have shifted and evolved significantly
since the beginning of the conflict, when little was
known about how post-war Iraq would be governed.
The process is still unclear in light of the recent
change in U.S. leadership in Iraq and in the absence
of a UN-run transitional authority. Security Council
Resolution 1483 of May 22 does not completely clari-
fy these ambiguities. The resolution states that the
establishment of an “Iraqi Interim Administration” will
be undertaken “by the people of Iraq with the help of
the Authority and working with the Special
Representative…”61 Thus it remains unclear which
entity will take the lead in this process. In the period
before the resolution was passed, control was firmly
held by the U.S. The resolution does refer to an “inter-
nationally recognized” future government, which sug-
gests that some sort of legitimating process will even-
tually take place through the UN. In the interim peri-
od, however, it seems likely that the Iraqi Interim
Administration will be run by the U.S.
As noted in a previous section, tensions within the
administration itself have also contributed to some
uncertainties. In addition, Congress has expressed
concerns about U.S. efforts. On May 23, 2003, the
majority and minority leadership of the House
International Relations Committee and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee issued a request to the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a detailed review of the U.S.-led reconstruction of
GOVERNANCE OF IRAQ
Highlights:
 While the UN has begun some limited humanitarian-
based reconstruction activities in Iraq, it has not yet
been involved in the establishment of an interim or per-
manent Iraqi government. The terms of Resolution 1483
are somewhat ambiguous as they relate to which entity,
the Authority or the UN, will take the lead in helping
Iraqis form a new government. 
 U.S. plans for the transition to a democratic government
in Iraq remain unclear. It is not known which individual or
individuals will lead the Iraqi Interim Administration, how
long the U.S. will remain involved after the Administration
is established, and how much influence it will exercise in
composing the make-up of a representative government.  
 The Bush Administration has warned that balancing
women’s rights while ensuring indigenous control over
the future government of Iraq will be difficult. Special
efforts will be needed to ensure that future electoral
bodies are not disproportionately governed by men.
 In an effort to protect future institutions and social struc-
tures from the lingering effects of Saddam Hussein’s
regime, the U.S. has banned all ranking members of the
Baath Party from holding government jobs or leadership
positions, totaling 15,000-30,000 people.  
61 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003, Operative Paragraph 9.
Iraq.62 The request letter asked GAO to seek out information that Congress has requested from the
administration for months, including how long the U.S. plans to occupy Iraq and estimates for
reconstruction costs. Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL), chairman of the House International Relations
Committee, stated on a separate occasion that a “lack of transparency” has made Congressional
oversight difficult.63
While administration officials have said that an Iraqi Interim Administration would govern in the peri-
od between the cessation of the conflict and the establishment of a permanent democratic govern-
ment, it remains unclear which individual or individuals will lead the transitional authority, how long
the U.S. will remain involved after an Iraqi transitional authority is established, and how much influ-
ence it will exercise in composing the make-up of a representative government. The United States has
asserted that its foremost goal is to turn the governance of Iraq over to Iraqis as soon as possible.64
Efforts Prior to Resolution 1483
Under the leadership of retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, U.S. officials and the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) organized and oversaw a series of meetings with Iraqi delegates to
plan for an interim authority. With the arrival of L. Paul Bremer, III, as the President’s special envoy, it
remains unknown whether ORHA, which had been charged with primary responsibility for humani-
tarian relief, reconstruction, and civil administration, will continue its efforts in this regard. 
During the second meeting in this series, on April 28, nearly 300 Iraqi delegates in Baghdad voted to
convene again in late May to select the leadership of an interim government. A week before this meet-
ing was to be held, Bremer announced that it would be pushed back to July. On a
separate occasion, and despite the previous impression that the Iraqi delegates
would themselves select the new leadership, Garner told reporters that a council of
up to nine Iraqis will “work together to provide leadership,” and announced the
names of five individuals he expects to be included, all of them Kurdish or exile
leaders with close working ties to the U.S. (see page 27 for a list of these leaders).
The U.S. has also announced that former Baath Party members will be excluded
from leadership positions in a new government.  
U.S. officials have met with a wide range of Iraqi representatives and in April spon-
sored two meetings to discuss the formation of an interim government. At a meeting
on April 15, 2003, about 100 delegates issued a statement of principles, calling for the
establishment of a “democratic federal system” of government that respects diversity,
promotes the rule of law, and dissolves Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party.65 At a second meeting on April 28,
2003, about 300 Iraqi delegates, both those who had remained in the country during the rule of Hussein
as well as representatives of the exile community, decided that the new governing body chosen by the
U.S. would be referred to as a “transitional government” instead of the Iraqi Interim Authority favored by
the U.S. government.  The use of the phrase “transitional government” implies a more complete and
rapid turnover of governing responsibilities to Iraqis, while an “interim authority” would still be under
the control of the occupying powers and would only slowly turn governing responsibilities over to
Iraqis. Since the April 28 meeting, the U.S. has gradually moved away from using the term “transitional
government.” Resolution 1483 uses the term “Iraqi Interim Administration.”  
62 The letter, signed by Representatives Henry Hyde (R-IL) and Tom Lantos (D-CA), and Senators Richard Lugar (R-
IN) and Joseph Biden (D-DE), requested information on the effectiveness of security efforts, humanitarian pro-
grams, political operations in Iraq, and economic development. 
63 James Dao, “Congressman Seeks Review of U.S. Effort to Aid Iraq,” The New York Times, May 16, 2003.
64 President George W. Bush, Lima Army Tank Plant, Lima, Ohio, April 24, 2003,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030424-6.html. See also Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Press Briefing,
April 8 2003, “We will leave Iraq completely in the hands of the Iraqis as quickly as possible.” 
65 Statement of Iraqi delegates, Nasiriyah, April 15, 2003, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/19714.htm.
















President George W. Bush,
speech to workers at a
tank factory in Lima, Ohio, 
April 24, 2003:
“One thing is certain: We will
not impose a government on
Iraq. We will help that nation
build a government of, by
and for the Iraqi people.”
The selection of participants in these U.S.-sponsored meetings has been controver-
sial. U.S. officials did not release a list of attendees, but asserted that all were hand-
picked or vetted by U.S officials after being nominated by fellow Iraqis. There has
been criticism that the meetings are dominated by Iraqi exiles. Shiite clergy, for
example, who represent a significant portion of the population, refused to partici-
pate in the first meeting held on April 15 and voiced suspicion about the effort, but
sent a small delegation to the April 28 meeting.
Once established, an interim government as originally envisioned would begin to
take over some governmental responsibilities from ORHA and work towards the for-
mation of a provisional government with broader powers. Initially, control of key
ministries including defense, state security and intelligence would remain with the
U.S.-led coalition, but other ministries including health, education and agriculture
could be handed over more quickly. The U.S. plan has been for the provisional gov-
ernment to draft a constitution that would be approved by the Iraqi people and then
oversee the transfer of the administration and full control of Iraq to a permanent
democratically elected government. 
For the time being, it remains unclear how an interim government set up primarily
by the U.S. would be received by the international community. Many Security
Council members had previously stated reluctance to endorse any U.S. actions in
Iraq until the U.S. makes clear the role the UN will have in post-conflict Iraq, and
garners support for its plans from the international community. Yet Resolution 1483,
as mentioned above, designates a somewhat ambiguous role for the international
community and the UN in establishing the interim government. 
This final resolution formally authorizes the Authority to help the Iraqi people and work with the
Special Representative to set up an Iraqi Interim Administration. It authorizes the Authority to dis-
burse funds collected from Iraqi oil revenue to finance reconstruction. The resolution stipulates that
the UN’s role in general will be to work with the Authority and the Iraqi Interim Administration,
rather acting as the overall coordinator of the post-conflict effort. 
Many parties agree that the transition to a democratic government is more likely to succeed if Iraqi
reconstruction is a multilateral project backed by the UN, but even with the passage of Resolution
1483, the involvement of other parties remains uncertain. It is also unclear to what extent coalition
partners of the U.S. will participate in the creation of a new government in Iraq, though they are
included under the phrase “the Authority” to which much of the control is ceded in Resolution
1483.66 Many argue that the participation of other countries would help allay fears voiced by Arab
officials and commentators about U.S. intentions in Iraq. Participation would also ease the burden on
the United States. 
Shaping a New Iraqi Government
Despite the dominant role of the United States in post-war Iraq, many lessons from past post-conflict
situations can be applied to building a new government in Iraq. There remain significant gaps between
administration plans and concerns on the ground. For example, U.S. military officials and civilian lead-
ers stress the importance of giving the Iraqi people choice in their future government. But the complex
66 In general, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has been more supportive of UN involvement than his American counter-
part, prompting President Bush to promise Prime Minster Blair at the Azores Conference on March 16, 2003, that
the U.S. would “work closely with the international community, including the United Nations.” 
















U.S. Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage, 
BBC Interview, May 7, 2003:
“...the 300 or so participants
at the Baghdad conference
[of April 28] seem to feel
we’re on a good path
towards full representation
for all ethnic and religious
groups. If there’s an area
where I feel that’s probably
fallen short, but having real-
ized we’re going to correct
it, it is in the representation
of women. We need to have
even higher levels of partici-
pation of women in this
process. We’ve realized that
we haven’t done as well thus
far in this area and we are
redoubling our efforts...”
array of political, religious, and ethnic groups in Iraq
may make such democratic choice-making difficult,
even with extensive outreach. In addition, the long-term
dominance of the Baath Party makes it difficult to prop-
erly investigate the credentials of those who claim to
represent new political forces or exile groups.
Following is a survey of principles which have been
emphasized in previous efforts to rebuild governments
in post-war states and which will likely prove necessary
for a successful transition in Iraq:69
Emphasis on the Local Level
Previous post-conflict governance efforts illustrate the
value of focusing on local or community governance, and
using economic and social reconstruction projects as a
means of community consensus-building. Previous recon-
struction efforts also illustrate the need to provide quick
assistance to communities outside of the capital. Tangible
evidence of assistance is an important indicator of change
to those further from the center of transition efforts.
Integration and Representation of Diverse
Groups
Iraq’s diverse ethnic groups and religious divisions (see
pages 22-27) may mean that a central government selected
by a simple electoral majority will exacerbate, rather than
mitigate, conflicts and rivalries. Some experts have recom-
mended the establishment of “a geographically based, fed-
eral system of government in Iraq,” which would allow cer-
tain semi-autonomous regions such as the Kurdish area in
the north to retain relative independence without threaten-
ing the country’s territorial integrity.70 Others contend that
such a model could be excessively divisive and might spark
further interethnic or religious conflict.71
















Iraqi Principles for a Future Government
On April 15th near Nasiriyah, a group of nearly 100 Iraqis,
convened by the U.S., met to discuss future governance
and the best ways to achieve democracy in their nation.67
At the end of the session, the Iraqi participants voted to
approve a final statement proposing several principles for
a future Iraqi government, published by the U.S. State
Department as follows:68
1. Iraq must be democratic.
2. The future government of Iraq should not be
based on communal identity.
3. A future government should be organized as a
democratic federal system, but on the basis of
countrywide consultation.
4. The rule of law must be paramount.
5. Iraq must be built on respect for diversity, includ-
ing respect for the role of women.
6. The meeting discussed the role of religion in
state and society.
7. The meeting discussed the principle that Iraqis
must choose their leaders, not have them
imposed from outside.
8. Political violence must be rejected, and Iraqis
must immediately organize themselves for the
task of reconstruction at both the local and
national levels.
9. Iraqis and the coalition must work together to
tackle the immediate issues of restoring security
and basic services.
10. The Baath Party must be dissolved and its effects
on society must be eliminated.
11. There should be an open dialogue with all nation-
al political groups to bring them into the process.
67 Statement of Iraqi delegates, Nasiriyah, April 15, 2003, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/19714.htm.
68 In a follow-up conference held in Baghdad on April 28, 2003, U.S. officials brought together almost 300 delegates,
mainly Iraqis, to decide on a process for creating a legitimate new Iraqi interim administration. According to observers,
the participants—including Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Kurds, Turkomans and members of the Disapora—were far
more diverse than had been the group of 100 delegates in attendance at the April 15 conference near Nasiriyah. At the
April 28 meeting, the delegates approved a statement which ordered a national conference to be held in late May and
called for U.S.-led forces to improve security measures, for the United Nations to lift sanctions and for the international
community to forgive Iraq’s debts, including war reparations owed to Kuwait. (Alissa J. Rubin and Michael Slackman,
“AFTER THE WAR: Iraqis Agree to Agree on a New Government,” The Los Angeles Times, April 29, 2003.)
69 Major reports include the following: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S.
Army, “Play to Win: The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Report, ” January 2003; Robert Orr, “Governing
When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation,” The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2002; Independent
Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq: The Day After,” March 12,
2003; International Crisis Group, “War in Iraq: Political Challenges After the Conflict,” March 25, 2003; U.S. Institute
for Peace Special Report, “Bosnia Report Card,” December 11, 1998; Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A
Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq,” January 2003; United States Institute of Peace Special Report
No. 102, “After Saddam Hussein: Winning a Peace If It Comes to War,” by Ray Salvatore Jennings, February 2003.
70 Independent Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq: The Day
After,” March 12, 2003, pp. 9-10. 
71 International Crisis Group, “War in Iraq: Political Challenges After the Conflict,” March 25, 2003, p. 26; in refer-
ence to an Iraqi opposition plan for a bi-national federal system along Arab-Kurd lines, the authors of the report
contend that “The politicization of religious and ethnic groups  coupled with the assumption that each group rep-
resents a cohesive and distinct unit is at odds with their actual plurality of views and interests.”
Ensuring Substantial Representation of Women
The Bush administration has warned that balancing women’s rights while ensuring
indigenous control over the future government of Iraq will be difficult; women’s
groups have in turn insisted that no tradeoffs be made at the expense of women’s
human rights. It seems clear that at the least, special efforts will be needed to ensure
that future electoral bodies are not disproportionately governed by men. The point is
illustrated by the April 15 town hall meeting in Nasiriyah organized by the U.S., in
which almost 100 opposition leaders and exiles met to plan the future of Iraqi
democracy. Only five attendees were women.
Toward Democratic Elections
Experts generally agree that conducting national elections should not be the first
step toward establishing a new Iraqi government.72 Before national elections can be
successfully held, experts say the interim government must sponsor a national dialogue to foster
acceptance of other groups and to develop understanding of common interests. They also suggest
holding local-level elections for municipal and provincial leaders and business and professional associ-
ations before staging a national vote. It may be that national elections will only succeed after indige-
nous constitution-drafting bodies, perhaps with international guidance, and other democratic institu-
tions have begun to take hold. 
Ensuring Iraqi Participation and Ownership
Aside from ensuring Iraqi participation at every level of decision-making, another way to ensure that Iraqis
have a stake in both the transition process and the future government will be to establish continuity among
existing Iraqi civil servants. In some past cases, new governments have relied both locally and nationally on
large numbers of existing civil servants who served a former regime, subject to proper personnel investiga-
tions.73 In Iraq, this important step will entail the development of a “de-Baathification” process.  
“De-Baathifying” All Sectors of Society
The need to purge future institutions and social structures from the lingering effects of Saddam
Hussein’s regime will be paramount and is a stated post-conflict goal of the administration. However,
the process will not be simple, as the Party’s reach was incredibly extensive and Party membership,
which was frequently imposed on Iraqis, is not an automatic indicator of strong allegiance with the
regime. Initially the U.S decided to ban only the upper echelons of the former regime from posts in
the new government, but on May 16, 2003 announced that all ranking members of the party—
totalling 15,000 - 30,000 people—would be banned from holding government jobs.  U.S. officials
acknowledged that this would lead to the rejection of some talented civil servants and the ousting of
some Baathists already recruited for leadership positions.
Other sections throughout this document highlight where de-Baathification will be most necessary. Some
essential examples include the vetting of police before re-deploying them on streets; balancing the need to
retain some continuity and expertise by re-employing previous civil servants with the need to respond to
Iraqis’ concerns about reinstituting former Party members; and ensuring that adequate justice mechanisms
are created to prosecute the most egregious criminals and help Iraqi society repair its social fabric.74
72 For example, early elections in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords did little to resolve the ethnic divisions or promote
the return of refugees and displaced persons. See U.S. Institute for Peace Special Report, “Bosnia Report Card,”
December 11, 1998.
73 This has more often been the case with members of the military than with civil servants, though in Eastern Europe
there was certainly retention of the workforce employed under the previous regimes. For example, see Rosenberg,
Tina, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts after Communism. New York, NY: Random House, 1995.
74 For a more detailed discussion of vetting corrupted individuals after a military occupation, including the difference
between “vetting out” and “vetting in” of former regime members, see United States Institute of Peace Special Report
No. 102, “After Saddam Hussein: Winning a Peace If It Comes to War,” by Ray Salvatore Jennings, February 2003. 


















Vienna, April 22, 2003:
“I think you know from
experience and history that
the UN has played important
roles in many countries
regarding the reconstruc-
tion, facilitation of political
processes, human rights, a
whole range of issues.”
The UN’s Role in Political Reconstruction 
While the UN has begun some limited humanitarian-based reconstruction activities
in Iraq, it remains to be seen exactly how it will proceed on other fronts under the
terms of Resolution 1483. The UN has not yet been involved in the establishment of
an interim or a permanent Iraqi government. When UN General Secretary Kofi
Annan was invited by the U.S. to send a representative to an April 28th meeting on
the formation of a temporary government, he declined, citing the need for clarity on
the UN role in reconstruction. Secretary General Annan has said the Security
Council must authorize such activities. Essentially, Resolution 1483 authorizes the
Authority to carry out such activities and authorizes the UN to participate in Iraqi
reconstruction as a partner rather than the overall coordinator.
At the most basic level, UN involvement in any stage of the transition to governance
can confer legitimacy on the process. The UN can help bring other international
powers to the effort and will help to allay concerns that the U.S. wishes to control
Iraq. In the pre-conflict period, some expert reports recommended that the transi-
tional authority be governed by the UN or handed over quickly under the auspices
of the UN, as in Afghanistan. The UN has not played that role in Iraq but there may
still be room down the road for its involvement in governance and transition activi-
ties, including the drafting and implementation of a constitution and the conduct
and monitoring of elections, though the UN is not exclusively charged with any of
these activities under Resolution 1483.  

















In the early stages of the aftermath of conflict, Secretary General Kofi Annan spelled out a clear
vision for the future of a free and self-governing Iraq.
“The international community, for its part, must be guided in its future policy and actions towards
Iraq by a set of basic principles, which I believe we all share:
 the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Iraq;
 the right of the Iraqi people to freely determine their own system of government and political
leadership, as well as to control their own natural resources;
 the need to help the people of Iraq, as quickly as possible, to establish conditions for a normal life,
and to put an end to Iraq’s isolation;
 the need for any role entrusted to the United Nations, beyond the purely humanitarian, to be man-
dated by the Security Council, consistent with the Charter, and one matched by the necessary
resources.
 and finally, above all, the need to give pride of place, in all our thinking, to the rights and interests
of the Iraqi people. Only so can we hope to ensure a viable future for Iraq.”
— UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Athens, April 17, 2003
Statement of the
Permanent Mission of
Germany to the United
Nations, May 22, 2003:
“The Resolution provides the
framework in which the
United Nations has been
strengthened and can take a
central role in the political
and economic process. It is
important now to give the
Iraqi people the perspective
of building a democratic and
stable government, at peace
with itself and its regional
neighbors, a respected mem-
ber of the family of nations.
The United Nations system
will help them to realize it.
Germany stands ready to
contribute to their efforts.”














While transitional administration and future governance are the most important issues for the future of
Iraq, security, justice and social well-being are central to the creation of any effective government.
Regardless of who administers the transition or runs a future government, there are a host of short- and
long-term needs which must be met. Without immedi-
ate humanitarian relief and adequate security, the situa-
tion on the ground will only worsen. An interim
administration that fails to prepare for the future by
neglecting to construct a justice system, provide for
education, or rehabilitate the financial structures of the
country, is likely to severely handicap a new govern-
ment.   
The following sections outline some commonly recog-
nized short-, medium-, and long-term needs for Iraq,
compiled from reports and NGO publications.75
In the Short-term: Immediate
Reconstruction Needs for the First
Three Months
Security: Peacekeeping, Policing, and 
Constabulary Forces
Provision of adequate security is one of the most basic
and immediate needs in all post-conflict reconstruction
situations. Without security, power vacuums can easily
lead to chaos, violent reprisals against past oppressors,
inter-ethnic or political clashes, and widespread criminal activity that can further damage infrastructure
and capacity for rebuilding. The “spoiler” phenomenon in security vacuums is well-documented and
can significantly impede reconstruction efforts. In addition, if security is not well coordinated with
other transitional and short-term administration matters, individuals or groups will likely attempt to
seize power in the interim. This has already been the case in Iraq, where various individuals have tried
to claim governing authority in Baghdad and elsewhere. In general, the failure to pro-
vide adequate post-conflict security has been a lingering problem in Iraq.
Security and policing currently fall to the U.S. military and its coalition partners,
who must fulfill certain obligations as occupying powers under the Geneva
Conventions, including preventing looting, protecting hospitals and other civilian
facilities, and restoring essential services in a timely fashion (see page 6 for further




 Security remains one of the country’s most pressing
needs. In many cases the security situation has inhibited
the ability of UN agencies and NGOs to move in and
establish the presence they need to begin large-scale
relief and assistance operations.
 Determining if there are weapons of mass destruction,
and if so, securing evidence and eliminating any stock-
piles, remains one of the most urgent challenges in Iraq.
It remains unclear whether this task will eventually be
returned to international inspectors or if the U.S. and UK
will continue to take the lead. 
 It will be necessary in the first months to create a tempo-
rary legal system that can adjudicate emergency claims,
deal with crime on the streets, provide facilities to incarcer-
ate individuals, and detain members of Saddam’s regime.
75 Adapted from a timeframe written by Johanna Mendelson-Forman, Senior Program Officer for Peace, Security, and Human Rights at
the United Nations Foundation, from an AUSA/CSIS general framework for reconstruction and attributed to additional reports
accordingly. The needs in this section are drawn largely from the following list of reports. Center for Strategic and International
Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, “Play to Win: The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Report, ” January
2003; Independent Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq: The Day After,” March
12, 2003; International Crisis Group, “War in Iraq: Political Challenges After the Conflict,” March 25, 2003; ; Center for Strategic
and International Studies, “A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq,” January 2003; United States Institute of
Peace Special Report No. 102, “After Saddam Hussein: Winning a Peace If It Comes to War,” by Ray Salvatore Jennings, February
2003; United Nations Association of the United States of America, “Rebuilding Iraq: How the United States and the United Nations
Can Work Together,” April 2003; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Iraq Post-Conflict Justice: A Proposed Plan,” International Human Rights
Law Institute, Summer 2003; The Atlantic Council of the United States, “Winning the Peace: Managing a Successful Transition in
Iraq,” January 2003; United States Institute of Peace, “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” by Robert Perito, April 2003.
President George W. Bush,
message to the Iraqi 
people, April 10, 2003:
“Coalition forces will help
maintain law and order, so
that Iraqis can live in security.”
In both the short- and long-term, devising the appropriate security strategy is difficult and must be
tailored to the individual needs of each country, depending on factors including the existence and
influence of regional alliances, the status of remaining indigenous police forces, the level of UN
involvement, and the existence of a Security Council mandate. Following are several key points:
 Providing adequate initial policing is one of the keys to successful transitions. In Iraq, imme-
diate post-conflict security has been provided by U.S. military and coalition forces under the
direction of Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan. Despite planning, many immediate security needs
went unmet and extensive looting and attempts to seize power ensued. Rather than quickly
returning Baghdad police officers to duty, about 20,000 additional U.S. troops and military
police are going to the Baghdad area to join the 49,000 already there.76
Even more than one month after the cessation of conflict, the security situation remained
precarious. In initial meetings with Iraqi representatives of religious and ethnic groups, inad-
equate security has loomed large. In some cases, the security situation has also inhibited the
ability of UN agencies and NGOs to move in and establish the presence they need to begin
large-scale relief and assistance operations.
 Seeking further Security Council authorization for security forces may be neces-
sary if the U.S. wants to recruit further international civilian police (CIVPOL) and
peacekeeping troops, which it is currently doing on an ad hoc basis with coalition
members. The U.S. has put forth a plan to divide Iraq into three sectors for the
purposes of security patrols, one of which would be patrolled by the U.S., one by
the UK, and another by Poland. Initially, ten nations had agreed to provide troops
to this effort, but Poland, Germany, and other nations then announced that they
would not send troops without a UN authorization. Reports of a NATO
announcement that it will aid Poland’s efforts to send troops through some tech-
nical and logistical support, though not through a full-blown NATO contribution
as it has done in Afghanistan, may indicate that Resolution 1483 of May 22 will
provide a sufficient mandate. 
Unlike past peace enforcement missions that had Security Council authorization,
such as NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Kosovo and the Australian-led InterFET
operation in East Timor, the capacity of security forces in Iraq before the passage of
Resolution 1483 was limited. Security Council authorization for a U.S.-led effort
may help to “de-Americanize” and increase the capability of security forces by allow-
ing other nations which insist on UN involvement to participate; but the lack of an
explicit mandate for international or UN-led peacekeeping may also be a deterrent.
In general, expanding the forces would help to improve cost-sharing and legitimacy,
and would allow the U.S. to draw on extensive UN expertise.
 Adding civilian police to military forces, whether through U.S. recruitment or under UN
supervision, is a widely-supported alternative to using militaries to fill local law enforcement
needs. Regular military forces are often ill-suited for enforcing the peace, particularly those
that have just been involved in the conflict itself. In fact U.S. military leaders have argued in
the past that transitional civilian policing and police training should be undertaken by others.
Civilian forces can be international, domestically retrained and redeployed police forces, or a
76 Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Looting Is Derailing Detailed U.S. Plan to Restore Iraq,” The New York Times,
May 19, 2003.













Senator Pete Domenici 
(R-NM), Hearing of the
Defense Subcommittee of
the Senate Appropriations
Committee, May 14, 2003:
“I remain genuinely con-
cerned that we are in a situ-
ation where we have won
the war and we lose the bat-
tle…it is absolutely impera-
tive that the United States
maintain order regardless of
how difficult it is, because
without it there is a real
chance that the people of
[Iraq] will assume that the
victory we claim is not a vic-
tory at all.”
combination of both. The UN has long experience in the vetting and reintegration of indige-
nous police. The provision of adequate local law enforcement capabilities has long-term conse-
quences, as it will ultimately impact the success of efforts to establish rule of law in Iraq. 
Humanitarian Relief
Iraq was a country already wracked by serious humanitarian crises before this current conflict, as a
consequence of internal misrule, previous wars, and a decade of economic sanctions. After the 2003
military action, both old and new problems need urgent attention.
By most accounts, the immediate humanitarian crisis in Iraq is not as serious as was feared before the
conflict, when it was estimated there could be more than one million refugees and another two mil-
lion internally displaced persons (IDPs). But many grave problems remain, including the hardships
caused by the weeks following the conflict when there was no power in major urban areas. The sec-
tors of the Iraqi population which have already been most affected are women and children. 
In the short term, the biggest uncertainty is identifying the agency or institution that will implement
the relief efforts being commissioned and directed by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA) and its leadership. Some UN agencies are already on the ground, but relatively few
non-governmental relief agencies were initially involved.
The U.S. military’s initial engagement in humanitarian work was marked by inefficiency and, in some
cases, confusion and delay. Incidents in which MREs (meals ready to eat) and bottled water were
thrown by U.S. and UK troops to crowds of hungry Iraqis from the backs of trucks demonstrate the
problems inherent with military involvement in aid provision.  
Following are some immediate on-the-ground humanitarian needs:
 Water. Some 70 percent of Iraqis live in urban areas, and they rely on centralized systems for
water distribution and waste disposal.77 Interruption of these systems by power failures or
physical destruction raises the possibility of epidemic diseases. Indeed, deterioration of these
systems during the past decade contributed to high infant mortality rates; between 1984 and
1999, the mortality rate for children under five in Iraq more than doubled, to 131 deaths per
1,000 births.78
According to the UN, water in Iraq still has to be boiled before drinking and purification
chemicals are in short supply.  An IRC assessment found that “the whole [water] system
needs rehabilitation, especially in Basra…Nobody took care of the system before the war
started.”79 In addition, a continuing problem in purifying and disseminating water is the lack
of electricity. In Baghdad, only a very small percentage of water stations are getting electricity.
The remainder of stations is now forced to rely on generators, which reduces productivity by
50 percent. A sharp concern is the impending summer, in which rising temperatures may
exacerbate water shortages. 80
 Food. The UN World Food Program’s rapid assessments in and around Baghdad in early
April indicated that most people had enough food to last through early to mid-May, and it
appears that local managers from the Ministry of Trade continued to dispatch food aid during
the war. However, on May 14, the United Nations UNICEF agency warned that more than
77 Department of Defense, “News Articles: U.S., Aid Agencies Ready to Assist Impoverished Iraqis,” March 25, 2003,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/n03252003_200303258.html.
78 UNICEF Information Newsline, “Iraq Survey Shows Humanitarian Emergency,” August 12, 1999,
http://www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm.
79 Ruth Gidley, “Agencies Say Iraq Needs Security, Water and Salaries,” Global Policy Forum, April 29, 2003,
http://www.globalpolicy.org.
80 UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, “Iraq: Struggle to Restore Basic Services,” May 15, 2003,
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/ea52d8fdc0626a3b85256d270057ef13?
OpenDocument.













300,000 Iraqi children face death from acute malnutrition, twice as many as before U.S. and
British forces invaded the country in March.81
Most initial estimates pointed to the need for the Oil for Food program to be continued into
the near future as an emergency relief program; it remains to be seen whether the six months
allocated by Resolution 1483 will prove sufficient. In the meantime, assessments of the Oil
for Food program’s Public Distribution System (PDS) have found that the network remains
largely undamaged. Insecurity is the biggest hurdle to resuming use of the PDS, due to the
vulnerability of warehouse and food agents.
 Power. According to the International Committee for the Red Cross, power shortages are a
continuing problem in Iraq, particularly for hospitals in Baghdad, where electricity capacity is
at only 30-40 percent.82 In major cities, military engineers have restored electricity to 100
percent in the center of Basra (but not in the suburbs), to 80 percent in Mosul, and to 100
percent in Kirkuk.83 Despite these successes, the IRC warns that electricity is not stable any-
where and power shortages have had a serious effect on Iraq’s modern water system, as many
experts predicted before the war.  
 Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Though the recent war did not create sig-
nificant refugee problems, nearly one million Iraqis had been displaced in the northern part of
the country as a result of the earlier conflicts and the discriminatory ethnic policies of the
Baghdad regime, and significant refugee communities exist in neighboring countries, including
Iran and Jordan. UNHCR is now on the ground in Iraq and will primarily deal with IDPs.
 Public health. The coalition was careful to exclude Iraq’s humanitarian infrastructure from
military targeting lists, but inadequate provision of security immediately after the war led to
looting of hospitals, clinics and other health care institutions. Although experts say that Iraq’s
health professionals are generally well-trained and competent, the institutions they staff need
repair as well as basic medical supplies.  
In the short-term, sanitation is also a major problem. UNICEF reported on May 15 that hun-
dreds of thousands of tons of raw sewage were being pumped into the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers every day, due to large numbers of inoperative treatment plants affected by looting.  The
WHO has confirmed 16 cases of cholera in Basra as of May 9, 2003, and a cholera task force
has been assembled, bringing together WHO, UNICEF, the Ministry of Health, and NGOs.
 Psychosocial trauma. There has not been time to assess the psychological needs of Iraq’s peo-
ple. But given the traumas of the past decades, these needs are likely to be extensive.
Conflicts, including wars and civil strife, as well as abusive and repressive regimes, affect a
large portion of society and often result in widespread mental illness.  According to the
WHO, conflict situations take a heavy toll on the mental health of the people involved, most
of whom live in developing countries, where capacity to take care of these problems is
extremely limited. Between a third and half of all the affected persons experience mental dis-
tress and, more specifically, often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder.84
81 Robert Evans, “Iraqi children face death from malnutrition – UN,” Reuters, May 14, 2003.
82 Ruth Gidley, “Agencies Say Iraq Needs Security, Water and Salaries,” Global Policy Forum, April 29, 2003,
http://www.globalpolicy.org.
83 Ruth Gidley, “Agencies Say Iraq Needs Security, Water and Salaries,” Global Policy Forum, April 29, 2003,
http://www.globalpolicy.org.
84 The World Health Report, 2001: Mental Health; New Understanding, New Hope, “Burden of Mental and
Behavioural Disorders, Determinants of Mental and Behavioural Disorders, Conflicts and Disasters,”
http://www.who.int/whr2001/2001/main/en/chapter2/002h4.htm.













Weapons Inspections and Destruction 
President Bush’s oft-stated reason for the war in Iraq was to disarm the country of its nuclear, chemi-
cal, and biological weapons and materials. Despite extensive searches during and after the war, no
weapons have been found. And on May 11, reports stated that the U.S. weapons team—charged with
finding evidence of the weapons programs described by Secretary of State Colin Powell in his state-
ment before the UN Security Council on February 5—would be returning home
within a month, without success. Resolution 1483 initially leaves weapons inspec-
tions in the hands of the Authority, and states that relevant Security Council resolu-
tions on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may be “revisited,” though it is
unclear if this means they will be implemented or dismantled. One preambulatory
clause of 1483 also reaffirms “the eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq,”
but fails to specify whose certification would suffice. 
Determining if there are WMD, and if so, securing evidence and eliminating stock-
piles, remains one of the most urgent short-term challenges in Iraq. Reports of loot-
ing at some Iraqi nuclear sites, particularly at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center
30 miles south of Baghdad, led the General Secretary of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, to issue a statement on May 19, 2003
that “nuclear and radioactive materials may no longer be under control” in Iraq.85
The U.S. has agreed to begin talks with the IAEA to make arrangements for IAEA
teams to return to Iraq to determine what may have been stolen from nuclear sites.
These teams are trained to not only examine what remains at the site and what is
missing, but also to try to determine where the missing items went.
The stance of the United States on international inspectors has varied somewhat, but is
generally characterized by a firm desire to control and execute the inspections.
Speaking to reporters on April 24, 2003, U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte
stated that there would be no immediate role for UN inspectors and asserted that the
U.S. coalition “had assumed responsibility for the disarming of Iraq…for the time
being and for the foreseeable future, we visualize that as being a coalition activity.”86
The Bush administration has since been toning down its objections to UN inspec-
tors. Undersecretary of State John Bolton has stated that though he does not foresee
a role for the UN “in the short term in searching for, or identifying, or securing weapons of mass
destruction,” he nonetheless will not “necessarily rule out some kind of UN role down the road.”87
Other countries such as France have demanded that UN weapons inspectors be the ones to certify
that Iraq’s WMD have been discovered and destroyed. They argue that international inspectors can
bring unique credibility to the search and validate what is discovered. It remains unclear exactly how
the process of disarmament will unfold under the terms of Resolution 1483. 
Justice Package for Immediate Needs
Though much of the rebuilding and restructuring of Iraq’s legal system will have to take place in the
medium- and long-term, it will be necessary in the first months to create a temporary system which
can adjudicate emergency claims and deal with crime on the streets, including facilities to incarcerate
individuals and detain members of Saddam’s regime.
85 Walter Pincus, “U.S., IAEA Negotiate Sending Teams to Iraq,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2003.
86 CNN.com, “Powell: France faces consequences,” April 24, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/04/23/sprj.nilaw.france.sanctions/.
87 John Bolton, “Weapons Hunt,” Newshour With Jim Lehrer, May 5, 2003. 













Hans Blix, Executive Chairman
of UNMOVIC, United Nations,
April 22, 2003:
“I think the inspectors [the
U.S. and UK] are using are
professional people. They will
seek as objective information
as they can. But clearly there
is a difference. International
inspectors operate under UN
rules. They are under statuto-
ry obligations not to take
instructions from any govern-
ment, and governments are
also under obligation not to
instruct them. Therefore, tes-
timony by international
inspections, provided that it
has been prepared profes-
sionally, carries I think greater
credibility with the interna-
tional community.”
Though under the Geneva Conventions, Iraqi law is in effect and the U.S. as an occupying force has
very limited authority to change its provisions, U.S. forces in Iraq have begun to “arrest” certain indi-
viduals such as the would-be mayor of Baghdad, and Gen. David D. McKiernan issued a proclamation
stating that “the coalition alone retains absolute authority within Iraq.”88 The process of creating and
implementing a permanent legal code will continue into later phases of reconstruction, but these early
incidents of legal disputes demonstrate the need for that process to begin as soon as possible.89
Typical recommendations for short-term “justice packages” include the provision of effective police,
courts, and prisons. Lessons learned about the difficulty of quickly establishing such institutions in
past post-conflict situations have led some experts to recommend that the UN form a rapidly deploy-
able set of individuals and a working legal code to take effect in the immediate and interim period of
post-conflict situations. But in the absence of such a capacity, the need remains for justice specialists
such as legal experts, judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and corrections officials who can immedi-
ately begin to administer justice. In Iraq, this need is particularly urgent given the numbers of arrests
in security clampdowns and the fact that the U.S. is beginning to vet possible criminals from the
thousands of Iraqis who held membership in the Baath Party.
The other short-term necessity is to begin to document and preserve evidence of war crimes or mass
atrocities, especially as the country begins to embark on rebuilding efforts which may disturb or
destroy important sites.90 The UN Security Council can establish a Commission similar to that estab-
lished under Resolution 780 in 1992 in the former Yugoslavia, which would begin to collect such evi-
dence. The disturbing discoveries of large mass graves around the country between May 11-14 have
amply demonstrated this necessity; indeed, Human Rights Watch issued a report on May 14 charging
that the U.S. had knowledge of one particular grave for more than a week but did not respond to
pleas from local officials to protect the site and crucial evidence that it undoubtedly contains.91
Cultural Restoration and Protection
While original estimates for the loss of cultural artifacts incurred by looting of the National Museum of
Iraq and fire damage to the National Library were much higher than has actually been the case, a signifi-
cant number of irreplaceable artifacts remain missing and Iraq’s cultural institutions are still endangered.
The bulk of the task of repair and reconstruction of the facilities is likely to take place in the medium-
and long-term, but in the immediate period, the U.S. has begun to facilitate the return of looted goods
and artifacts. Some artifacts have already been returned to U.S. officials through this process. 
A U.S. investigation of the antiquity loss from the Baghdad Museum began on April 22, 2003. The
goal of the investigation, according to the team leader Col. Matthew Bogdanos, is “not criminal prose-
cution but the return of these antiquities to the Iraq people.”92 Hundreds of pieces have been recov-
ered from Iraqi citizens through an amnesty program. At the end of May 2003, the team—made up
mostly of military and civilian investigators from the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement—had nearly completed the preliminary phase of its investigation to identify the losses
88 Michael R. Gordon and John Kifner, “U.S. Warns Iraqis Against Claiming authority in Void,” The New York Times,
April 24, 2003.
89 This need is further demonstrated by the recent events in Baghdad in which 300 Iraqis, allegedly violent criminals
who had been released by Saddam Hussein in a massive prison exodus before the conflict began, were arrested and
jailed by U.S. forces between May 14-15. According to Bremer, the mass arrests were part of a security clampdown
in Baghdad. See Terence Neilan, “Bremer Says U.S. Is Tackling Security Problem in Baghdad,” The New York Times,
May 15, 2003.
90 Examples of successful efforts to preserve evidence of war crimes can be seen in the cases of Sierra Leone, Rwanda,
and Yugoslavia. In each of these cases, a truth and reconciliation commission was established to collect available
evidence and record the experiences of both victims and aggressors. War crimes were then adjudicated by Special
Courts (Sierra Leone) or International Criminal Tribunals (Yugoslavia and Rwanda). For more information on the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, see http://www.un.org/icty/; For ICT for Rwanda, see
http://www.ictr.org/. Failures also exist, for example in the case of El Salvador, see Mark Ensalaco, “Truth
Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment,” Human Rights Quarterly, November 1994, Vol.
16, No. 4, pp. 597-675. 
91 Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: U.S. Unresponsive on Mass Graves,” May 14, 2003.
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/05/iraq051303.htm. See also Associated Press, “3,000 Bodies Exhumed at Iraq Mass
Grave,” May 14, 2003.













and was ready to begin tracking down the missing artifacts, which U.S. officials stated would “require
the cooperative and concerted effort of all nations.”93
Efforts to begin repairing the damage and extending future protection to Iraq’s cultural heritage
have also been made by the British Museum, in conjunction with UNESCO, which has called for a
meeting of top curators from around the world to address the issue. The Museum director issued a
statement on April 15 saying that the Museum had made its expertise available to UNESCO and “as
soon as possible, our Iraqi colleagues should be able to determine priorities and establish a pro-
gramme for reconstruction.”94
According to the Director-General of UNESCO, Koichiro Matsuura, UNESCO is also preparing to
reopen a Baghdad office as soon as possible to help with the recovery effort. On May 2, 2003 the
Director announced that negotiations were underway with the U.S. State Department to send a team
of antiquities experts to Iraq to assist in cataloging and tracing items looting from the country’s muse-
ums.  The UNESCO director has also requested that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan ask the
Security Council for a resolution placing a temporary embargo on the acquisition of any Iraqi cultural
objects and calling for such goods to be returned if acquisitions or exports have already taken place.
The terms of Resolution 1483 do contain some provisions for the protection of cultural artifacts.
In the Medium- and Long-term:
Reconstruction Needs for the First
Three to Twelve Months
Financial and Monetary Needs
Reforming and revitalizing Iraq’s economy will be a
formidable but vital reconstruction need.95 One of the
most important and far-ranging tasks will be to
remove the structures of entrenched cronyism and
favoritism that characterized the Iraqi economy under
Saddam Hussein’s regime and which worsened in the
sanctions era as the economy became more distorted
by illegal markets. 
Resolving the issue of vast international arrears that
Iraq has amassed from previous wars and foreign debt
will also be paramount. Overall, Iraq’s total financial
obligations are estimated at over $383 billion. This
number includes Gulf War compensations (52 per-
cent), total foreign debt (mainly government-to-gov-
ernment loans, and including IFIs) (33 percent) and
the value of pending contracts (15 percent).96 Figures given for Iraq’s foreign debt, which is a major
component of the total debt, range from $62-$130 billion.97 As part of this foreign debt, Iraq owes
92 Colonel Matthew Bodganos, “Department of Defense News Briefing,” May 16, 2003.
93 Colonel Matthew Bodganos, “Department of Defense News Briefing,” May 16, 2003.
94 Statement by the British Museum Director, “Iraqi Cultural Heritage,” April 15, 2003, http://www.thebritishmuse-
um.ac.uk/newsroom/current/iraq.doc.
95 For further information on economic rebuilding, please see pp. 14-17 on the possible role that international finan-
cial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank may play.
96 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for Post-conflict Iraq,” January
23, 2003, based on information collected in writing and phone interviews from the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC).
97 Note that the range in estimate foreign debt revolves around disputed assistance given by the Gulf States to Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war (approx. $30 billion); specifically, whether this money was given as a grant or a loan.
Susanna Mitchell, “Jubilee Research Briefing on Debt in Iraq,” April 17th, 2003. See also Center for Strategic and
International Studies, “A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq Supplement I: Background
Information on Iraq’s Financial Obligations,” January 23, 2003, pg. 3, figure 3. 
















 Reforming and revitalizing Iraq’s economy will be essen-
tial, including the need to remove structures of
entrenched cronyism that characterized the Iraqi econo-
my under Saddam Hussein’s regime, as well as the need
to restructure debt servicing and to overhaul the agricul-
tural system.  
 According to the U.S. government, the most urgent
needs for rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure include assess-
ment and repair of power generation facilities, electrical
grids, municipal water systems and sewage systems, and
rehabilitating or repairing airports and seaports.
 Reforming Iraq’s existing legal system and implementing
accountability mechanisms for egregious war crimes and
crimes against humanity are high priorities.
$82 million to the World Bank and $52 million to the IMF, which some experts expect could be paid
off with Iraqi oil revenues.98
It is still somewhat unclear in what forum Iraq’s debt will be addressed but Iraq is not expected to
begin repayment of debts until after 2004.99 Resolution 1483 “calls upon the international financial
institutions to assist the people of Iraq” and further welcomes efforts by the Paris Club, an informal
group of sovereign creditors, to “seek a solution to Iraq’s sovereign debt problems.” At their annual
meeting on April 13, 2003, the World Bank and IMF invited the Paris Club to take up the issue of
Iraq’s debt.
Before any debt restructuring or servicing will take place, all parties agree that an official number for
the extent of Iraqi debt will have to be reached. Some reports indicate that the IMF will take the lead
on providing this figure, but the Paris Club has also indicated that it will assess Iraqi debt as the first
step in its continuing efforts. It seems clear that either one of the two bodies, or some combination of
both, will be called upon to assess Iraqi debt to Paris Club countries. Further, the IMF has agreed to
assess debts to countries outside the Paris Club, including others in the Middle East.
The Paris Club’s organizational mandate is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment
burden of debtor nations. At their monthly meeting on April 24, 2003, Paris Club creditors agreed that
they stood ready to engage on Iraq’s debt. However, there is some uneasiness in the international com-
munity about having the Paris Club fix the terms of repayment because engagement with the Paris
Club usually results only in debt rescheduling for troubled countries and not any debt cancellation. 
Some experts are advocating for the cancellation of “odious” debts related to Saddam Hussein’s mili-
tary expenditure. U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow has remarked that “certainly the people of Iraq
shouldn’t be saddled with those debts incurred through the regime of the dictator who is now
gone.”100 One option being discussed is an immediate suspension of reparation payments to the UN
Compensation Committee (UNCC), and a moratorium on debt payments until the completion of an
arbitration process in which claimants would have to prove that the loans for which they seek repay-
ment are not “odious.” This is unlike the Paris Club, which would either provide its own figure or
accept the IMF’s assessment of Iraq’s debt, rather than require creditors to substantiate their claims. 
Additionally, the Paris Club does not deal with debts of non-member creditors, and a portion of Iraq’s
debt is owed to non-Paris Club nations. Some experts have suggested that an alternative to using the
Paris Club for debt restructuring might be to form an ad-hoc group of creditors to restructure Iraq’s
debt, after assessing what portion of the debt should be considered odious. Additionally, debt to
banks will be handled through the London Club, which restructures commercial debt, to reach an
agreement similar to the Paris Club for repayment of unpaid Iraqi loans to commercial creditors.
Other vital components of economic reconstruction include the following:
 Convening a donors conference through the UN to raise additional funds and organize those
already contributed upon appeal by the Secretary General;
98 For example, World Bank Director James D. Wolfensohn, “Press Conference: 2003 Spring Meetings of the World
Bank and the IMF,” Washington, D.C., April 10, 2003; Wolfensohn states that “there are significant cash flows in
Iraq that I think would make $82 million a sum that they could pay if they were keen to do so.” See
http://www.worldbank.org/. 
99 Reports on May 27 indicated that the Group of 8 (G8) made preliminary agreements to impose a moratorium on
repayment of Iraqi debt through 2004. See Kathleen Ridolfo, “G-8 Reportedly Set to Grant Moratorium on Iraq’s
Foreign Debt,” Iraq Report: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 23, 2003. http://www.rferl.org/iraq-report/ Also
based on comments by Undersecretary of the Treasury, John Snow, from a mid-May meeting of finance ministers in
Deauville, France. Ed Crooks, “International Economy: Ministers Agree Iraq Needs more Time to Service Debt,”
Financial Times (FT.com), May 19, 2003.  
100 Undersecretary of the Treasury John Snow, speaking to Fox News and quoted in Alan Beattie, “US in push for Iraqi
debt relief,” Financial Times, April 10th 2003.













 Generating enough jobs and income — for example, by ensuring that large numbers of civil
servants returning to work receive remuneration immediately —to enable a revitalized flow
of cash and goods;
 Reforming the banking sector to facilitate credit and cash flow;101
 Reforming the agricultural sector, upon which 25-30 percent of the Iraqi populace depends
for livelihood, and which has been hard hit by years of overdependence on oil, lack of func-
tional or environmentally-friendly irrigation, mechanization of production, and large-scale
rural-to-urban migration. 
 Reforming or replacing Iraq’s currency, which will become more important after the immedi-
ate reconstruction period. Reports have indicated that while a new Iraqi currency may be
eventually introduced, the U.S. has no immediate plans to replace the Saddam-era ban-
knotes, and instead will leave that option to the future Iraqi Interim Administration. In addi-
tion to the U.S. dollar, two forms of currency are currently in circulation in Iraq: the first is
the “Saddam” dinar and the second, the “Swiss” dinar, is an older form of currency which has
been used in Kurdistan and has generally been preferred in the post-conflict era. 
Legal System
Far from a failed state, Iraq under Saddam Hussein had a highly centralized government, a function-
ing bureaucracy with a large body of able civil servants, and a fairly extensive set of legal codes. Many
of the same post-conflict reconstruction processes for convening a constitutional commission and cre-
ating and implementing a legal code will be duplicated in Iraq, but these efforts will not begin with a
blank slate. Not only will it be important to integrate Iraqis, both from within and without the coun-
try, in the creation of a legal order, but several expert reports recommend working from existing docu-
ments and salvaging as much as possible from them. 
Specialists recommend that the bulk of this task be controlled and organized by the United Nations,
which has extensive experience, and that the deployment of legal teams with Arabic-speaking capabil-
ities will be necessary, if not for the immediate administration of justice, then for the process of judi-
cial reform. Yet Security Council Resolution 1483 does not specify how a legal process will take place,
except to say that the Special Representative should encourage international reform efforts. 
In the first six months, experts say three major legal initiatives should be launched: an internationally
and Iraqi staffed commission should begin reviewing the existing constitution with an eye toward
developing a new charter, modeled after the constituting process in Afghanistan; a similarly staffed
body should complete the code and statutory reform; and teams with language capabilities should be
deployed around the country to educate Iraqis about the rule of law, human rights, and the role of the
two aforementioned bodies in reforming the existing code.  
One ongoing effort on Iraqi legal reform is the London-based Iraqi Jurist Association (IJA), which is
composed of jurists both inside and outside Iraq who research and publicize human rights and legal
issues in Iraq. During the Hussein era, the IJA conducted and published studies on Saddam Hussein’s
oppressive regime, his crimes against humanity and Iraq’s violations of international law. Prior to the
2003 war in Iraq, the IJA worked to bring together Iraqi opposition groups to advocate for a unified
program for reform in a post-Saddam administration. The IJA is currently working with members of
101 A special report by the United States Institute of Peace, for example, states that “the banking system in Iraq is vir-
tually non-existent.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report No. 102, “After Saddam Hussein: Winning a
Peace If It Comes to War,” by Ray Salvatore Jennings, February 2003, p. 9. 













the international community to convene a tribunal in which to try Saddam Hussein for war crimes.
The IJA has also participated in the State Department’s “Future of Iraq Project,” outlining their plans
for a post-Saddam Iraqi legal system. 
Justice, War Crimes, and Reconciliation 
The Bush administration has suggested three types of accountability mechanisms for crimes commit-
ted by Iraqis in conflict and during the regime of Saddam Hussein:102
 Trials for crimes against U.S. forces during this war or the 1991 Gulf War, to be conducted
solely by the U.S., most likely through military commissions; 
 Trials for crimes against citizens of other nations, mainly Kuwaitis, conducted by those
nations or possibly through a joint Iraqi-Kuwaiti process; and, 
 Trials for crimes against humanity committed against Iraqis during the Hussein regime.
While previous post-conflict models for prosecutions against egregious criminals have result-
ed in such ad hoc international tribunals as the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), or more recently, in hybrid tribunals such as in Sierra
Leone, the case for Iraq promises to be somewhat divergent and less multilateral. Pierre-
Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, has testified that the adminis-
tration favors an as-yet unspecified “Iraqi-led process that will bring justice for the years of
abuses that have occurred.” 103 The administration has said that this could range from tri-
bunals to truth and reconciliation commissions.
The administration has been working with exiled Iraqi jurists on post-war accountability issues and says
that it will consult at an appropriate time with Iraqis still in the country. Ambassador Prosper has stated
further that the administration acknowledges there “will be a question as to whether or not the system
within Iraq has the capacity to address these abuses” and has offered to provide Iraq with “technical, logis-
tical, human and financial assistance.”104 The administration encourages the international community to
“step forward and be prepared to assist” this Iraqi-led process, but has argued that a multilateral tribunal is
neither necessary nor desirable in Iraq.105 Resolution 1483 did not contain any specific mechanisms for
establishing systems of accountability, nor did it indicate whether the UN or the U.S. would lead such an
effort; the only mention of accountability is a call to member states to deny safe haven to alleged criminals
and to “support actions to bring them to justice.”106 Previous statements by the administration, as cited
above, seem to point away from the involvement of the UN in establishing justice mechanisms.
Yet many scholars and experts argue that post-conflict justice in Iraq will require international credi-
bility; national support; and support for capacity-building of the justice system. Regardless of which
model for post-conflict justice will be applied in Iraq, many questions remain, including:
 Who will be prosecuted (including both major offenders as defined by international law and
minor offenders);
 What substantive and procedural law will apply (international criminal law, Iraqi law, or both);
 Which penalties will be applicable (including the death penalty); and
102 All information on the plans of the Administration for justice mechanisms are drawn from the following state-
ments: Pierre-Richard Prosper, testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, April 10, 2003;
Pierre-Richard Prosper, “Humane Treatment of Iraqi and U.S. POWs Under Geneva Conventions,”  Department of
Defense Briefing, April 7, 2003, http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rm/19448.htm; and Richard Willing, “Prosecution of
war crimes could get complicated,” USA Today, April 15, 2003.
103 Pierre-Richard Prosper, testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, April 10, 2003.
104 Pierre-Richard Prosper, “Humane Treatment of Iraqi and U.S. POWs Under Geneva Conventions,”  Department of
Defense Briefing, April 7, 2003. http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rm/19448.htm.
105 Pierre-Richard Prosper, “Humane Treatment of Iraqi and U.S. POWs Under Geneva Conventions,”  Department of
Defense Briefing, April 7, 2003. http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rm/19448.htm.
106 Also, one preambulatory clause did affirm that there was a “need for accountability for crimes and atrocities com-
mitted by the previous regime.”













 How to deal with the perpetrators of lesser crimes, who will not be tried criminally, especially
given that the administration has begun to vet lower echelons of the Baathist Party from par-
ticipation in rebuilding efforts.
Some experts have proposed that prosecutions of major Baathist offenders—most notably Saddam
Hussein himself if he is captured—take place under the auspices of a mixed national/international
criminal tribunal, established by the UN, resembling the Sierra Leone model. The judges for this court
would be competent in Arab criminal law, and would be drawn from Iraq, Arab states and from others
elsewhere. They argue that a system established by the U.S., even if led by Iraqi exiles, will be seen as
illegitimate by many. A UN-backed tribunal with many nations participating, including Arab states,
would help avoid the perception of “victor’s justice.” Many nations would also be more likely to coop-
erate with such a tribunal, including surrendering defendants, locating witnesses and providing finan-
cial support; and furthermore, as some experts note, a mixed tribunal rather than a wholly interna-
tional body would also likely increase Iraqi participation and support. 
Experts propose that other lower-level offenders be prosecuted before Iraqi criminal courts, presuming
that such courts could be adequately reformed and staffed with judges who have the same core com-
petencies as those who would try major offenders. Other reports in favor of a multilateral approach
with many of the same advantages already mentioned, argue that an International Criminal Tribunal
for Iraq, modeled after those in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, would be the preferable option and could be
established more quickly than a hybrid court. 
The other aspect of implementing justice and promoting reconciliation is the possibility of establish-
ing truth commissions, modeled after those most famously employed in South Africa.107 A “Truth and
Reconciliation Commission” for Iraq could be established by the interim government. In light of the
large scale of violations committed under the regime of Saddam Hussein, this commission could be
expected to deal with several thousand cases. Outcomes could include restitution from admitted per-
petrators or victim compensation from a general fund that could be established for this purpose.
Putting this package in place would be a complex operation requiring adequate administrative support
and facilities, comprehensive record-keeping capacity, and support from international experts. It is also
essential to preserve evidence of mass crimes in the interim period, as evidenced by the post-conflict
discovery of several mass graves sites and charges that the U.S. did not adequately protect them.
Health, Education, and Human Welfare
Apart from immediate disaster relief, several humanitarian concerns which collectively contribute to
the well-being of Iraqi society will need to be addressed on a longer timeframe. These include:
 Health and Medical Systems. The re-staffing and repairs of the hospital and medical system
will need to extend past the short-term period. In the recent past, medical supplies have
been provided as emergency humanitarian relief through the Oil for Food program. Just as
with the agricultural/market sectors, Iraq’s medical infrastructure will need to be weaned
from reliance on international relief agencies and programs. In fact, Physicians for Human
Rights has called for the cessation of certain relief actions—such as the current plans for
delivery of field hospitals by various non-U.S. donor governments—which create a “parallel
health system,” erode pre-existing health facilities, and operate based on donor supplies
rather than assessment of on-the-ground need.108
107 For an overview of truth and reconciliation commissions, see Henry J. Steiner, ed., Truth Commissions: A
Comparative Assessment, WPF Reports 16. Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1997. For Iraq, see, for
example, United States Institute of Peace, “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” by Robert Perito, April 2003, p. 8.
108 Physicians for Human Rights, “Iraq Bulletin #4: Donated Field Hospitals Unresponsive to Iraqi Needs: Creates
Parallel Health System,” April 19, 2003, http://www.phrusa.org/research /iraq/bulletin_041903.html.













A USAID contract was awarded on April 30, 2003, to Abt Associates Inc., to normalize
health provision in the short-term and strengthen the overall health system in the longer
range. According to USAID, the contract is meant to support “Iraqi-led initiatives,” reform
and reinstate an Iraqi Ministry of Health, and determine the specific needs of the health sec-
tor and vulnerable segments of the populace. USAID also notes that the research and consult-
ing firm will coordinate with ongoing efforts by international agencies such as UNICEF, the
World Food Program, and the World Health Organization.
The difficulty of reforming the health system with the help of skilled Iraqi professionals was
well illustrated by the protests by doctors and health professionals in Baghdad over the U.S.
appointment of former Baath Party member Ali Shnan as the new Minister of Health. On
May 14, the U.S. forced him to resign in the face of his refusal to denounce the Party, though
his medical qualifications were not in question. 
 Education. At present, schools are only partially reopened in Iraq and some fear that the nec-
essary but lengthy processes of curriculum revision and “de-Baathification” of educational
materials will further delay their openings. The executive director of UNICEF and others
have strongly recommended that schools in Iraq be reopened as soon as possible, as they
serve important community functions beyond just schooling children; schools can serve as
centers for community-based support, as the location for health interventions, and can help
to keep children out of harm’s way in dangerous and unstable security situations. 
Reopening and improving schools in Iraq will not be easy. According to UNICEF, damages
wrought by the present conflict and subsequent looting only added to pre-existing condi-
tions. UNICEF notes that two decades of conflict and one decade of economic sanctions have
left 70 percent of Iraqi schools in dire need of renovation and repair, and that many of these
schools pose health hazards to the students. The current U.S. strategy for revamping Iraq’s
educational system is to award a contract through USAID to a U.S.-based private sector con-
sulting firm. It remains unclear how coordination with UNICEF will take place. 
Infrastructure
According to the U.S. government, the most urgent needs for rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure include
assessment and repair of power generation facilities, electrical grids, municipal water systems and
sewage systems, as well as rehabilitating or repairing airports, and dredging, repairing and upgrading
the Umm Qasr seaport. These needs were outlined in a USAID description of the terms of its largest
reconstruction contract to date, awarded to the Bechtel Corporation on April 17, 2003. According to
the USAID website, “through all of its activities, [Bechtel] will also engage the Iraqi population and
work to build local capacity,” though it remains unclear how these efforts will commence.109
In addition, the United Nations Development Program, which since 1997 has had extensive experi-
ence in direct rehabilitation and observation of infrastructural needs in Iraq under the auspices of the
Oil for Food Program, has developed a detailed plan for assistance in both the short- and long-term
phases of reconstruction. Now that Resolution 1483 establishes a Special Representative, UNDP may
be able to put some aspects of this plan into place.110
109 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “USAID Awards Reconstruction Contract,” April 17,
2003, http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2003/pr030417.html.
110 For further information on UNDP’s plan for rebuilding infrastructure, see
http://www.undp.org/dpa/journalists/postconflictiraq.html#UNDP%20Presence.













There is not yet a clear plan for the control and distribution of water in Iraq. Traditionally UNICEF
and the World Health Organization facilitate the decontamination and distribution of water during
post-conflict reconstruction. UNDP is working to repair a chlorine plant to treat drinking water.
Gender Issues
As experts and members of the administration have noted on many occasions, women were often the
target of brutal human rights and gender abuses during Saddam Hussein’s regime, facing such horrors
as beheading, rape, and torture. Reconstructing Iraq with a mind to gender issues will involve efforts
to rectify past atrocities and disproportionate, gender-based suffering as well as looking ahead to the
future by ensuring equality and representation for Iraqi women. Following are some examples of
issues that will need attention in order to redress the current situation:
 Retaining rights which have been afforded to Iraqi women under the secular regime. Unlike
some neighboring Arab countries, Iraqi women under the Baathist regime were able to work,
vote, drive, attend school, and hold political office. In order not to risk the loss of these
rights, an interim authority will have to balance representation and inclusive politics with
guarantees for rights of women. The extent of representation of religious Islamic elements in
the future government will play a large role in determining these policies. 
 Closing the gap in education and illiteracy. Though women were permitted education under
Saddam’s regime, the current gaps between illiteracy rates in men and women in Iraq are sig-
nificant.  Literacy rates for men are approximately 71 percent, while rates for women are only
45 percent.111 Improving general opportunity and closing the gender gap will be essential to
advancing the role of women in Iraq. 
 Ensuring substantial representation in elected office. The Bush administration has warned
that balancing women’s rights while ensuring indigenous control over the future government
of Iraq will be difficult; women’s groups have in turn insisted that no tradeoffs be made at the
expense of women’s human rights. It seems clear that at the least, special efforts will be need-
ed to ensure that future electoral bodies are not disproportionately governed by men. The
point is illustrated by the April 15 town hall meeting in Nasiriyah organized by the U.S., in
which almost 100 opposition leaders and exiles met to plan the future of Iraqi democracy.
Only five attendees were women.
Control of Natural Resources
Two vital resources and their industries will need to be rebuilt and governed in both the interim and
permanent governance period. 
 Water. Bechtel Group is the primary party in charge of rebuilding water infrastructure in Iraq.
There are no current plans to privatize water systems. Bechtel was awarded a contract by
USAID to cover many major projects in Iraq, including improving and ensuring the potable
water supply. The Bush administration said the restricted bidding was based solely on compa-
nies that were most qualified to do the work and on the need for expedited selection and
security clearances. However, the two-month process drew complaints from Congress and
from European companies about the secrecy and the decision to restrict bidding to a handful
of the largest U.S. construction companies. (For more on contracts, see page 47.)
111 CIA World Fact Book 2002, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html#People.













 Oil. Resolution 1483
authorizes the U.S. to
collect and disburse all
Iraqi oil revenue in the
interim period (for
more on the terms of
the resolution, see pp.




appointed by the U.S.
led- coalition to run the
country’s oil industry.
The Bush administra-
tion plans to structure
the post-war Iraqi oil
industry like a U.S. cor-
poration, with a chair-
man and chief executive
and a 15-member board
of international advis-
ers. Large scale deci-
sions on investment,
capital spending and
production are likely to
need the approval of
the advisory board,
which will act like a
board of directors. 
This advisory board has
already been created
and will be led by
Phillip Carroll, the for-
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Awarding Contracts for Reconstruction
The United States began awarding Iraqi reconstruction contracts in early March 2003,
although the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had been soliciting
bids since January 2003 from a select group of American contractors. These initial con-
tracts cover eight areas: bridge, road and port rehabilitation and repair; seaport
administration; airport administration; primary and secondary education; public health;
local governance; theater logistical support; and personnel support. A list of all con-
tracts awarded to date is available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq. 
USAID procedures require that contracts be awarded through a “full and open” com-
petition, but in this case, USAID exercised its authority to waive the competitive bid
process because of national security interests. This move also allowed USAID to act
quickly by limiting competition to experienced U.S. firms that had the necessary securi-
ty clearances. USAID waived the same competitive bid requirements for contracts for
the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Bosnia. 
The contracting process for Iraq has been criticized by Members of Congress for being
both secretive and exclusionary, and Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) and Senator
Ron Wyden (D-OR) have in fact introduced legislation to require full public disclosure of
non-competitive bidding.112 In addition, on April 8, 2003, Representatives Henry Waxman
(D-CA) and John Dingell (D-MI) asked the General Accounting Office to conduct a review
of the administration’s process for awarding reconstruction contracts for Iraq; Rep.
Waxman also asked that GAO investigate allegations of special treatment for Halliburton,
a company with close ties to Vice President Dick Cheney. Rep. Waxman said, “I find it per-
plexing and inexplicable that we are not getting information except in dribs and drabs,
and with each new piece of information the whole notion of the contract is changed.”113
The U.S. procedures for awarding contracts in Iraq has also raised ire from many foreign
countries, particularly those which had been awarded large contracts for work in Iraq
which had yet to be implemented and for which they have not been remunerated. Iraq
currently has pending contracts with Russian, Dutch, Egyptian, United Arab Emirates,
Chinese and French public and private entities. The sum total of these contracts is esti-
mated at $57.2 billion, or 15 percent of Iraq’s total post-war financial burden.114 These
contracts are primarily related to the energy and telecommunications sectors, and
Russia possesses an overwhelming majority of them at 90 percent, or $52 billion
worth.115 Resolution 1483 leaves the status of all present and outstanding Iraqi contracts
at the discretion of the Secretary General in his efforts to dismantle and transfer the Oil
for Food program to the Authority. 
Foreign governments and companies, particularly in Europe, have also raised concerns
that non-U.S. based companies will be excluded from further contracts awarded by the
U.S. government. U.S. foreign assistance law governing the contracts that have been
awarded so far allows only U.S. companies to be awarded prime contracts, but permits
using foreign companies as subcontractors. USAID administrator Andrew Natsios has
estimated that some 50 percent of U.S. reconstruction funds (equaling $900 million)
could go to foreign subcontractors.116. Iraqi firms were ineligible for subcontracts until
United Nations sanctions were lifted, which occurred under the terms of Resolution
1483 of May 22, 2003.
112 See S. 876, introduced by Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), April 10, 2003 and H.R. 1901, introduced by Rep. Maxine
Waters (D-CA) on April 30, 2003, to require public disclosure of noncompetitive contracting for the reconstruc-
tion of the infrastructure of Iraq, and for other purposes. Bill text can be found at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
113 Elizabeth Becker, “Iraq Reconstruction is Assailed,” The New York Times, Saturday, May 24, 2003. 
114 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq,” January
2003, p. 1, based on United Nations Compensation Commission Data.
115 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq,” January
2003, p. 1, based on United Nations Compensation Commission Data.
116 Edmund F. Scherr, “U.S. Aid Effort for Iraq Largest Since Marshall Plan,” U.S. Department of State International
Information Programs, March 26, 2003.
headed advisory board’s job will be to provide advice and guidance and ensure openness and
accountability. The country currently is pumping only 310,000 barrels a day (bpd), as com-
pared to 2.5 million before the war. It needs 550,000 bpd to meet domestic energy needs.117
According to one senior Iraqi oil official, looting and inadequate security have hampered
efforts to restore Iraqi oil output. The official said goals for oil output were to reach 1.3 mil-
lion bpd by mid-July, of which 750,000 bpd would be allotted for export.118 He went on to
say that “the pillage and looting at the oil installations this time was much more devastating
than in 1991,” in reference to sustained damage during the Gulf War.119
Fostering an Independent Media
Media in Iraq under the Baathist regime was state-owned, censored and ultimately a conduit for “dis-
information” propagated by the regime. Reforming and building a new system of independent journal-
ism will not only help the Iraqi political system flourish, but will likely work to the advantage of the
occupying forces and any international entities attempting to engage in reconstruction in Iraq, by
broadcasting changes being implemented and allowing the Iraqi citizenry to chart progress. However,
the U.S. and other foreign powers should be careful of attempting to control or use a media system to
paint reconstruction efforts in a bright, uncritical light. 
Building a free Iraqi media will require dismantling the state-controlled structures of the Hussein era,
while simultaneously training new Iraqi journalists and relying on the expertise of international and
Arabic-speaking specialists in the meantime. One report recommends the formation of an internation-
al media advisory board, composed of both Iraqi and international specialists, to ensure that any new
system of information dissemination is independent and trusted by the Iraqi populace.
Other efforts include the convening of a conference to design the legal framework for a democratic
media in Iraq, which will take place June 1-3, 2003 in Athens, Greece. The conference will be organ-
ized by Internews Network, a non-profit organization which supports open media worldwide, and
hosted by Greece.120 Other major participants in the three-day event will be UNESCO, the U.S.
Agency for International Development, the German Foreign Office, and the Russian Ministry of the
Press.  The conference will bring together Iraqi, Arab and Western media professionals to develop a
policy platform for legal and regulatory reform in Iraq. These reforms will seek to establish constitu-
tional guarantees for a free and independent Iraqi media, including a journalistic code of ethics and
privacy protection laws. According to Internews, working groups will produce a draft legal framework
for media and Internet policy for Iraq. 
Depleted Uranium
U.S. and British tanks used depleted uranium (DU) shells and armor in Iraq. When a weapon
equipped with DU strikes a solid object, like the side of a tank, it goes straight through before erupt-
ing in a burning cloud of vapor. This vapor settles as chemically poisonous and radioactive dust. Both
the U.S. and the UK acknowledge that the dust can be dangerous if inhaled, though they say the dan-
ger is short-lived, localized, and much more likely to lead to chemical poisoning than to irradiation (a
potentially more damaging, cancer-causing effect). The U.S. has announced that it has no plans to
remove the debris left over from depleted uranium weapons used in Iraq. It says no clean-up is need-
ed because research shows DU has no long-term effects, and that a 1990 study suggesting health risks













117 Peg Mackey, “Iraq Puts Back Oil Output Targets,” Reuters, May 19, 2003, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/news-
desk/L1989998.htm.
118 Peg Mackey, “Iraq Puts Back Oil Output Targets,” Reuters, May 19, 2003, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/news-
desk/L1989998.htm.
119 Peg Mackey, “Iraq Puts Back Oil Output Targets,” Reuters, May 19, 2003, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/news-
desk/L1989998.htm.
120 Greece will host the conference in its capacity as President of the European Union. 
to local people and veterans is out
of date. 
According to a United Nations
study, DU was still contaminating
air and water even seven years after
it was used. Many veterans from
the Gulf and Kosovo wars believe
DU has made them seriously ill.
According to the WHO, the kid-
neys are considered to be the main
site of potential damage from
chemical toxicity of uranium.
Other potential health risks from
depleted uranium affect the lungs
and the central nervous system.
The United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) is recommend-
ing that a scientific assessment of
sites targeted with weapons con-
taining DU be conducted in Iraq
as soon as conditions permit. The
UNEP plans to publish a “desk
study” on the Iraq environment
that will provide the necessary
background information for con-
ducting field research. This
research will examine risks to
groundwater, surface water,
drinking water sources, waste-
management and other environ-
ment-related infrastructure, facto-
ries and other potential sources of
toxic chemicals, and biodiversity. 
Landmines and Unexploded
Ordnance (UXO)
Landmines and unexploded ord-














Estimates of the monetary costs of war, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction
of Iraq have varied widely. Depending on the data and the methodology used,
the estimated total costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and post-war reconstruc-
tion and humanitarian aid have ranged from $12 billion to $1.9 trillion. The
differences lie not only in data analysis, but also on assumptions regarding the
number of troops, length of the war, deployment and redeployment of troops,
as well as post-conflict occupation, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction.
Resolution 1483 authorizes the Authority to use Iraqi oil revenue to finance
reconstruction and development. It remains unclear, given current production
rates, whether this revenue will be sufficient to bear the entire reconstruction
burden. The U.S. will rely on taxpayers and international donors to make up
any shortfalls between actual needs and revenue collected. 
On March 25, 2003, President Bush requested a supplemental appropriation of
$74.7 billion to pay for the war in Iraq, the ongoing war on terror, and recon-
struction efforts in Iraq through September 2003. Of the total, $2.4 billion is
for reconstruction in Iraq—bringing the total commitment of resources for
Iraq relief and reconstruction to $3.5 billion. The remaining funds are divided
between military operations ($62.6 billion) both in Iraq and in the war on ter-
rorism, and homeland security ($4.25 billion).121
The Bush administration has been criticized for being deliberately tight-lipped
about the estimated cost of both the war in Iraq and post-war reconstruction.
In September 2002, White House economic advisor Lawrence B. Lindsey pre-
dicted that the total cost for the conflict and reconstruction would be
between $100 and $200 billion. This was countered days later by Mitch
Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), who called
the estimate “very, very, high.”122 (Lindsey’s resignation in December, 2002 is
widely believed to have been forced in part because of his comments regard-
ing the cost of war in Iraq). Lindsey’s estimates are in line with those of the
House Budget Committee Democratic Staff for both the conflict and recon-
struction. They are low compared to Yale University economist William D.
Nordhaus’s worst case scenario estimate of $1.9 trillion for the conflict, recon-
struction and other costs.123
Other prominent estimates on costs include:
 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) estimates that annual post-conflict
costs may range from $16.8 to $20 billion per year. The CFR study suggest-
ed that President Bush allocate $3 billion to post-conflict reconstruction
and humanitarian assistance for the initial year with the promise of addi-
tional funding.124
 The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates that five
years of post-war occupation could cost between $25 billion and $105 bil-
lion and that humanitarian and other relief efforts could cost between $84
billion and $498 billion.125
121 Office of Management and Budget, “Fact Sheet: Iraq Relief and Reconstruction,” March 27, 2003, accessed at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/iraq_2.pdf; White House Fact Sheet, “Bush Requests $74,700 Million in Added
Funding,” March 25, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/text2003/0325bush.htm.
122 Letter from Representative John Spratt to the House Budget Committee Democratic Caucus, September 23, 2002,
http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/spending/iraqi_cost_report.pdf
123 Letter from Representative John Spratt to the House Budget Committee Democratic Caucus, September 23, 2002,
http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/spending/iraqi_cost_report.pdf; Mark Gongloff, “How much will
war cost?” CNNMoney.Com, March 19, 2003, http://money.cnn.com/2003/03/17/news/economy/war_cost/.
124 Independent Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq: The Day
After,” March 12, 2003.
125 Testimony of Steven Kosiak, Director of Budget Studies, The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
House of Representatives Budget Committee, February 27, 2003.  
nance (UXO) hindered Iraq’s recovery from the first Gulf War and will again complicate Iraq’s recon-
struction. In order to ensure the safety of Iraqi civilians and humanitarian aid workers as they rebuild
Iraq, workers must identify and mark off areas for landmine and UXO contamination. The local popu-
lation must also receive UXO awareness training to alert them to the dangers of UXO and how to rec-
ognize potentially hazardous devices.
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is preparing an emergency response team to sur-
vey and clear landmines and UXO. UNMAS’s work will cover a number of areas. It will survey and
clear mines and unexploded ordnance to make access routes and infrastructure safe. It will provide
support for the search and removal of booby traps and other improvised explosive devices, and it will
undertake UXO awareness training with the local population and offer assistance to victims.  
Before the current conflict, Iraq was already severely affected by landmines and UXO as a result of the
1991 Gulf War, the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran War, and two decades of internal conflict. The highest concen-
tration of landmines has been reported in Northern Iraq and along the borders with Iran, Kuwait,
Jordan, Syria and Turkey. U.S.-led forces did not use landmines in the recent conflict, but there have
been reports that Iraqi forces did lay mines on the Kuwaiti border and around Kirkuk in the north.
Controversy has also arisen over “cluster bombs” used by U.S. forces during the attack on Iraq, and a
number of “dud” bomblets that may not have exploded on impact as intended. While the U.S. mili-
tary has said that only 26 of the approximately 1,500 cluster bombs landed near civilian neighbor-
hoods, there has been a large outcry from the NGO community to ban cluster bombs because their
failure rate causes them to be an immense danger to civilians. 































History of Past Reconstruction
Efforts
There are many arguments on both sides of the spectrum as to who should control and administer
reconstruction. This section is intended to provide some historical background on past efforts by both
the UN and the U.S. in reconstruction and nation-building.   
Past UN Efforts
Recent history demonstrates that the UN can play a vital role in helping to design and implement
transitional tasks that range from restoring the legal system, to providing emergency health care, to
dealing with refugee return, to providing a network of volunteers to help bring government institu-
tions back into operation. While less than perfect, UN efforts from Somalia to Haiti to Bosnia to East
Timor demonstrate that the UN has been a central institution in the reconstruction of countries
emerging from conflict and can play a constructive role in a wide range of activities.
The UN system possesses considerable expertise and its presence increases the perceived legitimacy of
the operation in the eyes of the international community. In addition to bringing international sup-
port, the UN can attract additional funds through its
convening power and its leadership.126
What remains clear is that UN programs on the ground
are often the only international presence to remain in
the field after other nations move on to the next crisis.
It is this staying power that differentiates UN develop-
ment activities on the ground from the shorter-term
commitments of others, including the U.S. 
It should be noted, however, that the UN has not
always succeeded in meeting one of the most difficult
gaps in post-conflict reconstruction: providing for
internal security through policing. This was the case
in Bosnia, and continues to be an issue in
Afghanistan. For example, even after 18 months, secu-
rity in Afghanistan still remains so precarious that
many of the non-governmental organizations provid-
ing support to the reconstruction effort are often
barred from travel around the country (see pp. 53-54
for more on Afghanistan).
The following two cases provide brief summaries of
the UN’s largely successful involvement in two post-
conflict environments—East Timor and Kosovo.127
History of Past Reconstruction Efforts
Highlights:
 UN efforts from Somalia to Haiti to Bosnia to East Timor
demonstrate that, while not perfect, the UN has been a
central institution in the reconstruction of countries
emerging from conflict and can play a constructive role
in a wide range of activities.
 UN programs on the ground are often the only interna-
tional presence to remain in the field after other nations
move on to the next crisis; this staying power differenti-
ates UN activities on the ground from the shorter-term
commitments of others, including the U.S. 
 Provision of adequate security and policing has been a lin-
gering problem in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, as
was the case in Bosnia and Afghanistan. 
 The United States has a poor success rate in democratic
nation building, having created democracies that were
sustained for ten years or longer after the departure of
U.S. forces in only four of the sixteen nations it has
attempted to reconstruct in the last century.
126 This assertion is based on the “UN-plus” concept, which states that international response works best when one
nation is willing to take the lead role with the UN providing legitimacy and support. For a discussion of the UN-
plus concept, see Stanley Foundation, Laying a Durable Foundation for Post Conflict Societies. New York, NY:
Stanley Foundation, 2002, http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org/UNND02.pdf.
127 For a comprehensive list of UN peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, please visit
http://www.un.org/peace/index.html, the source from which these case studies were largely drawn. Another main
source for the section on East Timor is the Coalition for International Justice, http://www.cij.org. 
East Timor
The 24-year Indonesian occupation of East Timor was responsible for the deaths of up to 200,000
East Timorese. In 1999 the UN, which had closely monitored Timorese affairs for decades, was
charged with overseeing an electoral process that culminated with the people of East Timor voting to
become an independent nation. 
Immediately after release of the results, however, local militias supported by Indonesia forces began a
final, systematic campaign of destruction that left hundreds dead, hundreds of thousands displaced, and
up to 80 percent of East Timor’s infrastructure destroyed. In response, the Security Council, acting under
its Chapter VII authority, intervened to restore peace and stability in the region by dispatching a multina-
tional peacekeeping force of twenty nations, the Australian-led InterFET. This mission was followed by
the establishment of a UN-run mission, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). 
On May 20, 2002, East Timor was declared an independent nation, and the UN handed over its
authority to the newly formed East Timor National Parliament.  A UN presence remains in East Timor
to ensure security and stability of this new state during its first two years. Among its activities there is
continued cooperation with the UNTAET-established, mixed international/East Timorese panels of
judges to try anyone accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law dur-
ing the period of the occupation and the violence following the 1999 referendum. The tribunal is one
of the first such bodies to incorporate a hybrid set of judges and governing law. 
Kosovo
UNMIK, the UN Mission in Kosovo, was created in 1999 through Security Council authorization of a
mission to bring peace, stability, democracy, and, eventually, self-government to the embattled region.
Kosovo had suffered decades of unrest, culminating in military action led by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to eliminate Serbian repression. 
This UN undertaking is unique in its scope and structure, for it divides major tasks among the UN
and other international organizations, all under the UNMIK mandate. The UN is charged with provid-
ing humanitarian assistance, police and justice, and civil administration; the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) led democratization and institution-building efforts; the European
Union led reconstruction and economic development efforts; and a military force under NATO
authority remains charged with maintaining security in Kosovo.
The mission has achieved the following results:  local elections in all of Kosovo’s 30 municipalities in
October 2000; the adoption of a new Constitutional Framework for Kosovo in May 2001; province-
wide elections in November 2001; and the formation of a democratically elected government, includ-
ing a President and Prime Minister, in March 2002. 
The international community recognizes there are still considerable hurdles to clear in Kosovo,
including strengthening of civil institutions and establishing the law and order necessary to help
democracy and economic development. Additionally, the possibility of an eventual partition of Kosovo
into separate Serb and Albanian entities due to ongoing ethnic tensions in the region remains to be
settled by the international community. 



















The following is excerpted from a recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
on the record of U.S. nation-building: 128
Few national undertakings are as complex, costly, and time consuming as reconstructing the govern-
ing institutions of foreign societies. Even a combination of unsurpassed military power and abundant
wealth does not guarantee success, let alone quick results. Historically, nation-building attempts by
outside powers are notable mainly for their bitter disappointments, not their triumphs. Among great
powers, the United States is perhaps the most active nation builder. 
The record of past U.S. experience in democratic nation building is daunting. The low rate of success
is a sobering reminder that these are among the most difficult foreign policy ventures for the United
States. Democracy has been sustained for ten years or longer after the departure of U.S. forces in only
four of the sixteen nations and areas that the U.S. has attempted to reconstruct during the last century.
Two of these followed the total defeat and surrender of Japan and Germany after World War II, and
two were in the relatively small societies of Grenada and Panama. 
Unilateral nation building by the United States has met with even less success — perhaps because
unilateralism has led to surrogate regimes and direct U.S. administration during the post-conflict peri-
od. Not one American-supported surrogate regime has made the transition to democracy, and only
one case of direct American administration has managed this feat. Importantly, many of the factors
that experience shows are most crucial to success are absent in Iraq.129
Afghanistan: A Case in Progress
The experience of stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan offers clear illustration of the benefit
to U.S. security interests of systematic multilateral cooperation beginning early in the post-conflict
phase. The experience in Afghanistan also offers a modest cautionary example against the absence of
such cooperation. 
To an even greater extent than in Iraq, the United Nations, through its humanitarian agencies, was
present on the ground in Afghanistan for many years. The benefit to U.S. diplomatic, political,
humanitarian and security objectives of using this infrastructure and credibility cannot be overestimat-
ed. Security personnel were relieved of many civil affairs responsibilities, and U.S. civilian assistance
programs found ready-made frameworks for partnership and delivery of supplies. There were, howev-
er, complications due to ongoing military operations, lack of coordination between planning for mili-
tary and humanitarian operations, and inefficiencies in aid delivery. The sort of well-established opera-
tional coordination between UN agencies and NGOs that has characterized previous humanitarian
operations was largely absent from this case. These types of problems can be most easily solved by
working toward cooperative mechanisms for consultation, planning and operational coordination. 
The contribution made by the multinational security force in Afghanistan known as the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to overall security and to the interim Afghan govern-
ment also deserves note.130 By assuming responsibility for the security of the Kabul region, ISAF
allowed U.S. armed forces to concentrate on the conduct of military operations against Taliban
forces in the provinces. The security provided by ISAF allowed the Afghan government to function,
128 Excerpted with permission from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Lessons From the Past: the
American Record on Nation-Building,” by Minxin Pei and Sara Kaspar, May, 2003. See http://www.ceip.org. 
129 According to later excerpts from the CEIP report, such factors include three main categories. The first, favorable
internal characteristics, involve such characteristics as a strong national identity, a high degree of ethnic homogene-
ity, relative socioeconomic equality, existing state capacity, and previous experience with constitutional rule. The
second, convergence of geopolitical interests, involves the need for the outside power to have a compelling strategic
interest in success, the need for this strategic interest to be “broadly aligned” with the national interests of the tar-
get country, and the need for consensus on shared strategic interests within the target society. The third factor is
commitment to economic development, where pre-existing economic resources and the possibility for economic devel-
opment are paramount. 
130 For information on peace-building in Afghanistan, refer to http://www.unama-afg.org. See also Center For Defense
Information, “CDI Fact Sheet: International Security Assistance Force,” December 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terror-
ism/isaf_dec02-pr.cfm.


















and bolstered its authority. It also provided the conditions for a national political
consultative process to take place at the Loya Jirga. Many UN staff and others have
been pushing to expand ISAF operations beyond Kabul, but the UN Security
Council has not authorized such an expansion due to U.S. objections. Expanding
ISAF operations beyond Kabul could have prevented or lessened the impact of
many of the security problems reported in the provinces. Insecurity beyond Kabul
has been a lingering problem. 
In Afghanistan, within weeks of the start of hostilities, the United Nations along with
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, were able to mobilize an interna-
tional effort to raise the financial and technical resources to stabilize the country. 
Multilateral efforts were central to U.S. security interests and helped to relieve the
widespread suffering of civilians, help launch collaborative infrastructure reconstruc-
tion, and helped legitimize indigenous Afghan political authority. Of course, all these
remain central to U.S. security interests in Afghanistan. Among the outcomes of mul-
tilateral efforts were the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. 
The continuing value and viability of this type of multilateral process is demonstrat-
ed in the current Transitional Assistance Plan for Afghanistan (TAPA), which is a partnership between
the Interim Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA), and the international community. The
UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan has assisted ITGA in developing and implementing a needs-
based budget and plan, appealing for the necessary resources, and bringing together the efforts of 15
UN specialized agencies. This kind of effort can help integrate agencies, including NGO and bilateral
programs, and increase accountability and efficiency. 
This multilateral cooperation has leveraged limited U.S. resources to a total of more than $800 mil-
lion. It also offers more favorable means for realizing U.S. political and security objectives in
Afghanistan. Nonetheless, security continues to be a concern. In addition, World Bank findings sug-
gest that today only 23 percent of Afghans have access to safe water, 12 percent have sanitation, 6
percent have electricity, and 7 million people remain vulnerable to hunger.131
This is the context in which the Afghan transitional government is approaching the planning and con-
duct of the first free elections in decades. The Electoral Assistance Division of the UN department of
Political Affairs is working with the Afghan government to plan for these. The UN’s relative neutrality
has helped the international community balance U.S. interests in the emergence of a stable political
order with the need for the future government to be perceived authentic.  
The U.S. and the UK have announced the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in three
provinces and the intention to deploy them in four others. These will consist of U.S. military civil
affairs units, political officers from the U.S. embassy, and USAID-funded assistance teams. These have
been developed in consultation with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and it remains stated
U.S. policy to seek the widest possible participation in these from other bilateral donors. 
In the almost certain event that U.S. bilateral funding for Afghan aid will decline—for example, the
Emergency Response Fund which provided the lion’s share of initial U.S. civilian assistance in FY
2002 is eliminated entirely in the administration’s budget request for FY 2003—the argument for pre-
serving past U.S. investments by continuing multilateral cooperation will be all the more compelling. 
131 World Bank, “Afghanistan Update,” http://www.worlbank.org.





















mony, February 26, 2003:
“Afghanistan is not yet out
of the woods…. President
Bush … assured me that,
even if the United States and
the rest of the world get
engaged in other regions of
the world, Afghanistan will
not be forgotten, that
Afghanistan will continue to
receive assistance.”
132 A poll conducted March 20-24, 2003 found 41 percent saying the U.S. had a clear plan, with 46 percent disagree-
ing.  An earlier poll (March 7-9, 2003) found only 29 percent of respondents who said the U.S. had a clear plan,
while 49 percent disagreed.  The New York Times, April 11-13, 2003, 898 adults.
133 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
134 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
135 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003,  865 adults.
136 Sixteen percent say the U.S. is doing too little, 9 percent say too much.  The New York Times, April 11-13,2003,
898 adults.











Public opinion surveys in the United States have
found that most Americans feel that the United
States must take responsibility for helping Iraq
rebuild politically and economically.  At the same
time, the majority of Americans prefer that the
United Nations, and not the U.S., play the lead role
in reconstruction efforts.  
Americans also voice fears about the costs of recon-
struction and threats to U.S. military forces remaining
in Iraq. Surveys have continued to find, both before
and after the war, strong support for an active U.S.
role in the United Nations, as well as favorable atti-
tudes toward the UN itself. 
U.S. Responsibility and Planning
 The public is evenly divided on the question of whether the Bush Administration has devel-
oped “a clear plan for rebuilding Iraq.”  A New York Times survey found that 42 percent of
adults say the U.S. has such a plan while 45 percent disagreed.  The administration has made
no progress on this question since late March.132
 Almost three-quarters of Americans (73 percent) agree with the statement that “it would be
unwise and immoral for the U.S. to overthrow the government of Iraq and then just leave.”
This contrasts with the 24 percent who say “we shouldn’t spend money on rebuilding Iraq
when we have so many problems here at home.”133
 An overwhelming majority of Americans, 86 percent, say that with Saddam Hussein’s regime
no longer in power, the United States “has the responsibility to remain in Iraq as long as nec-
essary until there is a stable government.”  This proportion has held steady from February to
April of 2003.134
 72 percent of Americans say that the U.S. should remove its troops from Iraq only when “a
democratic government has been elected and there are laws that protect human rights.”
Only 12 percent back immediate withdrawal, while another 12 percent say the U.S. should
remove its troops even if a government is established but is not democratic or laws to protect
human rights have not been passed.135
 On more specific activities:
• 62 percent say it is “absolutely essential” that the U.S. “provide humanitarian aid like food,




 More Americans favor the UN, not the U.S., taking the
lead role in establishing a new government in Iraq.
 An overwhelming majority of Americans (86 percent) say
that with Saddam Hussein’s regime no longer in power,
the United States “has the responsibility to remain in Iraq
as long as necessary until there is a stable government.”   
 Americans are not optimistic about the prospects for
“the U.S. and its allies to install a stable democratic gov-
ernment in Iraq;” more than seven in ten say this task
will be very or somewhat difficult.
• 51 percent say the U.S. must “restore civil order” throughout the country, while 43 percent
say it is important but not essential.
• A plurality of 47 percent say it is “absolutely essential” that the U.S. “help establish a new
government in Iraq,” but 42 percent say it is important but not essential.  When worded
differently, however, a majority of 55 percent says the U.S. “has a responsibility to set up
the new government of Iraq,” while 39 percent disagree.137
• One of three Americans (34 percent) say the U.S. must “rebuild the infrastructure in Iraq,
like damaged roads, power plants and schools,” but a plurality of 43 percent say this is
important but not essential.138
 Despite diverging views over the war itself, overwhelming majorities in the United States and
most western European countries believe that the Iraqi people will be better off without
Saddam Hussein in power.  (79 percent U.S., 76 percent of British, 73 percent of French, 71
percent of Germans).139
Most Favor UN Taking the Lead in Reconstruction
 More Americans favor the UN, not the U.S., taking the lead role in establishing a new gov-
ernment in Iraq.
• Fifty percent say the UN “should temporarily govern Iraq and work with Iraqis to write a
new constitution and build a new democratic government” while 47 percent said the U.S.
should have this responsibility.140
• 55 percent of Americans say the United Nations should be in charge of “helping establish a
new government in Iraq,” with 39 percent saying the U.S. should take the lead.141 Support
is even higher when respondents are asked to compare an “international coalition” to the
U.S. (66 percent to 27 percent).
• 61 percent of Americans say that the United Nations should “take the leading role in
rebuilding Iraq and helping its people set up a new government” while 31 percent say the
United States should.142
 UN should have charge of relief and reconstruction.
• 57 percent say the UN “should direct humanitarian relief and reconstruction,” while only
40 percent say the U.S. should play this role.143
• 54  percent say the military should provide security “but the UN and international aid
organizations should be in charge of relief and reconstruction”; 29 percent say the U.S.
should be in charge of security, relief and reconstruction; and 14 percent say the military
should withdraw “shortly after the war is over.”144
• A slim majority of 51 percent say the UN should have charge of “awarding contracts to
companies for building the infrastructure,” with 41 percent saying the U.S. should have
this responsibility.145
137 The New York Times, April 11-13, 2003, 898 adults.
138 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
139 Pew Global Attitudes Project, March 10-17, 2003.
140 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
141 The Washington Post/ABC News, April 16, 2003, 504 adults.  An earlier The New York Times survey found 61 per-
cent saying the UN should have responsibility, with 34 percent for the U.S.  The New York Times, April 11-13,
2003, 898 adults.
142 The Washington Post/ABC News, March 27, 2003, 508 adults.
143 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
144 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
145 The Washington Post/ABC News, April 16, 2003, 504 adults.










 UN forces should take charge of security.  A majority of 54 percent say “a UN police force of
police officers from various countries” should be in charge of “maintaining civil order in Iraq
until a new government is established,” while 43 percent say the U.S. should do this.146
Another survey found 49 percent saying the UN should maintain civil order, with 45 percent
opting for the U.S.147
 Two-thirds of Americans (68 percent) believe that the UN or an international coalition should
“have the lead responsibility for rebuilding the economy in Iraq,” compared to 26 percent
who say the U.S.148
Recognition that Installing a Democracy Will Be Difficult
 Americans are not optimistic about the prospects for “the U.S. and its allies to install a stable
democratic government in Iraq.”  Polls conducted in February and April 2003 found that
more than seven in ten Americans say this task will be very or somewhat difficult.149
 A pre-war survey found that only 40 percent of voters said it was very or somewhat likely
that “democracy will be established in Iraq” but that 64 percent would not consider the war a
success if Iraq returned to a dictatorship.150
Fears about Threats to U.S. Military Forces Remaining in Iraq
 Two-thirds of Americans (67 percent) say they worry that “there will be an ongoing campaign
of guerrilla warfare against U.S. forces after the war comes to an end.”151
 Nearly three in four Americans (72 percent) say they are concerned that the U.S. “will get
bogged down in a long and costly peacekeeping mission in Iraq,” with 27 percent expressing
little or no concern.  Polls in late April 2003 showed a sharp increase in concern from earlier
in the month, when 62 percent said they were concerned, and 35 percent disagreed.152
 A plurality of 46 percent say U.S. troops will have to remain in Iraq for one year or longer,
with 30 percent saying six months to one year, and 20 percent six months or less.153
Concern over Cost of War and Reconstruction
 More than seven in ten Americans (71 percent) say they worry that “the cost of the war in
Iraq will be difficult for [the U.S.] to afford,” with 33 percent saying this worries them a great
deal.154 A pre-war survey found a slim majority of 52 percent who said that the war would
not be a success if the United States ended up financing the entire war and “must spend bil-
lions more to rebuild the country.”155
 Seventy percent of Americans say that “all in all, considering the costs to the United States
versus the benefits to the United States,” the war with Iraq was worth fighting, with 27 per-
cent disagreeing.156
146 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
147 The Washington Post/ABC News, April 16, 2003, 504 adults.
148 The New York Times, April 11-13, 2003, 898 adults.
149 Pew Research Center, April 10-16, 2003, 924 adults; Time-CNN, February.
150 Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, March 3-8, 2003, 1005 registered voters.
151 Pew Research Center, April 10-16, 2003, 924 adults.
152 The Washington Post, April 27-30, 2003, 1105 adults.
153 The New York Times, April 11-13, 2003, 898 adults.
154 Pew Research Center, April 10-16, 2003, 924 adults.
155 VVAF, March 3-8, 2003, 1005 registered voters.
156 Surveys conducted following the Gulf War in 1991 revealed similar opinions. The Washington Post, April 27-30,










 Seventy-seven percent of Americans say Congress should retain oversight over U.S. funds for
relief and reconstruction while 19 percent say Congress should “give the President full con-
trol” over these resources.157
Support for Multilateral Approach
 Nearly three in four Americans (73 percent) say that it is “necessary to get the participation
of a substantial number of other countries in the process of reconstructing Iraq.”  Similarly,
66 percent say it is necessary to get Arab countries involved.158
 Sixty-nine percent of adults say that, when it comes to rebuilding Iraq, the U.S. should “take
the views of other countries into account,” while 27 percent say the U.S. should “do what it
thinks is right no matter what other countries think.”159
 More than seven in ten Americans maintain that the U.S. should “share in efforts to solve
international problems together with other countries,” rather than “continue to be the preem-
inent world leader in solving international problems.”160 The public is divided over whether
the U.S. should take the leading role in helping other countries solve international con-
flicts.161
 Gallup notes that despite recurrent public support for the UN and multilateral action,
Americans “will still be ready to accept whatever the president actually decides to do.”  If
President Bush decided that the U.S. must exercise control in reconstructing Iraq, a total of
80 percent of Americans would accept that decision.  This include nearly two-thirds of those
who actually prefer that the UN, not the U.S., play the primary role.162
2003, 1105 adults.
157 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
158 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
159 The New York Times, April 11-13, 2003, 898 adults.
160 PIPA/Knowledge Networks, April 18-22, 2003, 865 adults.
161 A plurality (48 percent) agreed that the U.S. should take the lead role while 43 percent said the U.S. should not.
The New York Times, April 11-13, 2003, 898 adults.  
162 David W. Moore, Senior Editor, The Gallup Poll, “Post-Iraq: Do Americans Really Care About the United Nations,”
PollTalk, May 27, 2003.










163 All Security Council resolutions can be found on the UN website, arranged by year, at http://www..un.org/docu-
ments/scres.htm











Security Council Resolution 1483163
Resolution 1483 (2003)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting, 
on 22 May 2003
The Security Council,
Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions,
Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,
Reaffirming also the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of
eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq,
Stressing the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their
own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all parties concerned to support the creation of
an environment in which they may do so as soon as possible, and expressing resolve that the day
when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly,
Encouraging efforts by the people of Iraq to form a representative government based on the rule of
law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or
gender, and, in this connection, recalls resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,
Welcoming the first steps of the Iraqi people in this regard, and noting in this connection the 15 April
2003 Nasiriyah statement and the 28 April 2003 Baghdad statement, 
Resolved that the United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, the reconstruction of
Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative gover-
nance,
Noting the statement of 12 April 2003 by the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of the
Group of Seven Industrialized Nations in which the members recognized the need for a multilateral
effort to help rebuild and develop Iraq and for the need for assistance from the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank in these efforts,
Welcoming also the resumption of humanitarian assistance and the continuing efforts of the Secretary-
General and the specialized agencies to provide food and medicine to the people of Iraq,
Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Adviser on Iraq,
Affirming the need for accountability for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi
regime,
Stressing the need for respect for the archaeological, historical, cultural, and religious heritage of Iraq,
and for the continued protection of archaeological, historical, cultural, and religious sites, museums,
libraries, and monuments,
Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security
Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under
applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the
“Authority”),
Noting further that other States that are not occupying powers are working now or in the future may
work under the Authority,
Welcoming further the willingness of Member States to contribute to stability and security in Iraq by
contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Authority,
Concerned that many Kuwaitis and Third-State Nationals still are not accounted for since 2 August
1990,
Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to interna-
tional peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Appeals to Member States and concerned organizations to assist the people of Iraq in their
efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and to contribute to condi-
tions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with this resolution;
2. Calls upon all Member States in a position to do so to respond immediately to the human-
itarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organizations for Iraq and to
help meet the  humanitarian and other needs of the Iraqi people by providing food, med-
ical supplies, and resources necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq’s eco-
nomic infrastructure;
3. Appeals to Member States to deny safe haven to those members of the previous Iraqi
regime who are alleged to be responsible for crimes and atrocities and to support actions to
bring them to justice;
4. Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other rele-
vant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective
administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of
conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people
can freely determine their own political future;
5. Calls upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law
including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of
1907;
6. Calls upon the Authority and relevant organizations and individuals to continue efforts to
locate, identify, and repatriate all Kuwaiti and Third-State Nationals or the remains of those
present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990, as well as the Kuwaiti archives, that the previous
Iraqi regime failed to undertake, and, in this regard, directs the High-Level Coordinator, in
consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Tripartite
Commission and with the appropriate support of the people of Iraq and in coordination
with the Authority, to take steps to fulfil his mandate with respect to the fate of Kuwaiti










and Third-State National missing persons and property; 
7. Decides that all Member States shall take appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return to
Iraqi institutions of Iraqi cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical,
cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally removed from the Iraq National
Museum, the National Library, and other locations in Iraq since the adoption of resolution
661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, including by establishing a prohibition on trade in or trans-
fer of such items and items with respect to which reasonable suspicion exists that they
have been illegally removed, and alls upon the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, Interpol, and other international organizations, as appropriate, to
assist in the implementation of this paragraph;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq whose inde-
pendent responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the Council on his activities
under this resolution, coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict process-
es in Iraq, coordinating among United Nations and international agencies engaged in
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and, in coordination with the
Authority, assisting the people of Iraq through:
(a) coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by United Nations agencies
and between United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations;
(b) promoting the safe, orderly, and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons;
(c) working intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq, and others concerned to
advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representa-
tive governance, including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an
internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq;
(d) facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure, in cooperation with other interna-
tional organizations;
(e) promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development,
including through coordination with national and regional organizations, as appropri-
ate, civil society, donors, and the international financial institutions;
(f) encouraging international efforts to contribute to basic civilian administration func-
tions;
(g) promoting the protection of human rights;
(h) encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police
force; and
(i) encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform;
9. Supports the formation, by the people of Iraq with the help of the Auhority and working
with the Special Representative, of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional admin-
istration run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognized, representative government is
established by the people of Iraq and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority;










10. Decides that, with the exception of prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of
arms and related materiel other than those arms and related materiel required by the
Authority to serve the purposes of this and other related resolutions, all prohibitions relat-
ed to trade with Iraq and the provision of financial or economic resources to Iraq estab-
lished by resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, including resolution
778 (1992) of 2 October 1992, shall no longer apply;
11. Reaffirms that Iraq must meet its disarmament obligations, encourages the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to keep
the Council informed of their activities in this regard, and underlines the intention of the
Council to revisit the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and
Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in resolu-
tions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and 1441 (2002) of
8 November 2002;
12. Notes the establishment of a Development Fund for Iraq to be held by the Central Bank of
Iraq and to be audited by independent public accountants approved by the International
Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq and looks forward to
the early meeting of that International Advisory and Monitoring Board, whose members
shall include duly qualified representatives of the Secretary-General, of the Managing
Director of the International Monetary Fund, of the Director-General of the Arab Fund for
Social and Economic Development, and of the President of the World Bank;
13. Notes further that the funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the
direction of the Authority, in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration, for the
purposes set out in paragraph 14 below; 
14. Underlines that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner to
meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and
repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of
Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq;
15. Calls upon the international financial institutions to assist the people of Iraq in the recon-
struction and development of their economy and to facilitate assistance by the broader
donor community, and welcomes the readiness of creditors, including those of the Paris
Club, to seek a solution to Iraq’s sovereign debt problems;
16. Requests also that the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Authority, continue the
exercise of his responsibilities under Security Council resolution 1472 (2003) of 28 March
2003 and 1476 (2003) of 24 April 2003, for a period of six months following the adoption
of this resolution, and terminate within this time period, in the most cost effective manner,
the ongoing operations of the “Oil-for-Food” Programme (the “Programme”), both at head-
quarters level and in the field, transferring responsibility for the administration of any
remaining activity under the Programme to the Authority, including by taking the follow-
ing necessary measures:
(a) to facilitate as soon as possible the shipment and authenticated delivery of priority
civilian goods as identified by the Secretary-General and representatives designated by
him, in coordination with the Authority and the Iraqi interim administration, under










approved and funded contracts previously concluded by the previous Government of
Iraq, for the humanitarian relief of the people of Iraq, including, as necessary, negotiat-
ing adjustments in the terms or conditions of these contracts and respective letters of
credit as set forth in paragraph 4 (d) of resolution 1472 (2003);
(b) to review, in light of changed circumstances, in coordination with the Authority and
the Iraqi interim administration, the relative utility of each approved and funded con-
tract with a view to determining whether such contracts contain items required to
meet the needs of the people of Iraq both now and during reconstruction, and to post-
pone action on those contracts determined to be of questionable utility and the
respective letters of credit until an internationally recognized, representative govern-
ment of Iraq is in a position to make its own determination as to whether such con-
tracts shall be fulfilled;
(c) to provide the Security Council within 21 days following the adoption of this resolu-
tion, for the Security Council’s review and consideration, an estimated operating budg-
et based on funds already set aside in the account established pursuant to paragraph 8
(d) of resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, identifying:
(i) all known and projected costs to the United Nations required to ensure the con-
tinued functioning of the activities associated with implementation of the present
resolution, including operating and administrative expenses associated with the
relevant United Nations agencies and programmes responsible for the implemen-
tation of the Programme both at Headquarters and in the field;
(ii) all known and projected costs associated with termination of the Programme;
(iii) all known and projected costs associated with restoring Government of Iraq funds
that were provided by Member States to the Secretary-General asrequested in
paragraph 1 of resolution 778 (1992); and
(iv) all known and projected costs associated with the Special Representative and the
qualified representative of the Secretary-General identified to serve on the
International Advisory and Monitoring Board, for the six month time period
defined above, following which these costs shall be borne by the United Nations;
(d) to consolidate into a single fund the accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a)
and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995);
(e) to fulfil all remaining obligations related to the termination of the Programme, includ-
ing negotiating, in the most cost effective manner, any necessary settlement payments,
which shall be made from the escrow accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8
(a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), with those parties that previously have entered
into contractual obligations with the Secretary-General under the Programme, and to
determine, in coordination with the Authority and the Iraqi interim administration,
the future status of contracts undertaken by the United Nations and related United
Nations agencies under the accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (b) and 8
(d) of resolution 986 (1995); 
(f) to provide the Security Council, 30 days prior to the termination of the Programme,
with a comprehensive strategy developed in close coordination with the Authority and










the Iraqi interim administration that would lead to the delivery of all relevant docu-
mentation and the transfer of all operational responsibility of the Programme to the
Authority;
17. Requests further that the Secretary-General transfer as soon as possible to the
Development Fund for Iraq 1 billion United States dollars from unencumbered funds in
the accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995),
restore Government of Iraq funds that were provided by Member States to the Secretary-
General as requested in paragraph 1 of resolution 778 (1992), and decides that, after
deducting all relevant United Nations expenses associated with the shipment of authorized
contracts and costs to the Programme outlined in paragraph 16 (c) above, including resid-
ual obligations, all surplus funds in the escrow accounts established pursuant to para-
graphs 8 (a), 8 (b), 8 (d), and 8 (f) of resolution 986 (1995) shall be transferred at the ear-
liest possible time to the Development Fund for Iraq;
18. Decides to terminate effective on the adoption of this resolution the functions related to
the observation and monitoring activities undertaken by the Secretary-General under the
Programme, including the  monitoring of the export of petroleum and petroleum products
from Iraq;
19. Decides to terminate the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 661
(1990) at the conclusion of the six month period called for in paragraph 16 above and fur-
ther decides that the Committee shall identify individuals and entities referred to in para-
graph 23 below;
20. Decides that all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas from Iraq
following the date of the adoption of this resolution shall be made consistent with prevail-
ing international market best practices, to be audited by independent public accountants
reporting to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board referred to in paragraph 12
above in order to ensure transparency, and decides further that, except as provided in para-
graph 21 below, all proceeds from such sales shall be deposited into the Development
Fund for Iraq until such time as an internationally recognized, representative government
of Iraq is properly constituted;
21. Decides further that 5 per cent of the proceeds referred to in paragraph 20 above shall be
deposited into the Compensation Fund established in accordance with resolution 687
(1991) and subsequent relevant resolutions and that, unless an internationally recognized,
representative government of Iraq and the Governing Council of the United Nations
Compensation Commission, in the exercise of its authority over methods of ensuring that
payments are made into the Compensation Fund, decide otherwise, this  requirement shall
be binding on a properly constituted, internationally recognized, representative govern-
ment of Iraq and any successor thereto;
22. Noting the relevance of the establishment of an internationally recognized, representative
government of Iraq and the desirability of prompt completion of the restructuring of Iraq’s
debt as referred to in paragraph 15 above, further decides that, until December 31, 2007,
unless the Council decides otherwise, petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas










originating in Iraq shall be immune, until title passes to the initial purchaser from legal
proceedings against them and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, or
execution, and that all States shall take any steps that may be necessary under their respec-
tive domestic legal systems to assure this protection, and that proceeds and obligations
arising from sales thereof, as well as the Development Fund for Iraq, shall enjoy privileges
and immunities equivalent to those enjoyed by the United Nations except that the above-
mentioned privileges and immunities will not apply with respect to any legal proceeding in
which recourse to such proceeds or obligations is necessary to satisfy liability for damages
assessed in connection with an ecological accident, including an oil spill, that occurs after
the date of adoption of this resolution;
23. Decides that all Member States in which there are:
(a) funds or other financial assets or economic resources of the previous Government of
Iraq or its state bodies, corporations, or agencies, located outside Iraq as of the date of
this resolution, or
(b) funds or other financial assets or economic resources that have been removed from
Iraq, or acquired, by Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former Iraqi
regime and their immediate family members, including entities owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, 
shall freeze without delay those funds or other financial assets or economic resources and,
unless these funds or other financial assets or economic resources are themselves the sub-
ject of a prior judicial, administrative, or arbitral lien or judgement, immediately shall
cause their transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq, it being understood that, unless
otherwise addressed, claims made by private individuals or non-government entities on
those transferred funds or other financial assets may be presented to the internationally
recognized, representative government of Iraq; and decides further that all such funds or
other financial assets or economic resources shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities,
and protections as provided under paragraph 22;
24. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the work of
the Special Representative with respect to the implementation of this resolution and on the
work of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board and encourages the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to inform
the Council at regular intervals of their efforts under this resolution;
25. Decides to review the implementation of this resolution within twelve months of adoption
and to consider further steps that might be necessary;
26. Calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the
implementation of this resolution;
27. Decides to remain seized of this matter.











Past Security Council 
Resolutions on Iraq164
Reconstruction
Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003 – authorizes a range of reconstruction activities in Iraq (see Appendix 1,
page 59).
WMD / Disarmament / Inspections
Resolution 686, 2 March 1991 - demands Iraq’s compliance with past resolutions.
Resolution 687, 3 April 1991 - imposes strict cease-fire terms for Iraq.  Sets up the United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM), to implement the non-nuclear provisions of the resolution and to
assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the nuclear areas. -sponsored by U.S.
(France, Romania, UK, U.S., Zaire)
Resolution 689, 9 April 1991 - approves a six-month observer unit to enter Iraq.
Resolution 699, 17 June 1991 - further implements plans for disclosing and destroying weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq.
Resolution 700, 17 June 1991 - calls on states to enforce arms and technology embargo in Iraq.
Resolution 707, 15 August 1991 - demands Iraq’s compliance with weapons inspection teams.  
Resolution 715, 11 October 1991 - requests UN action on inspections in Iraq for weapons of mass destruction.
Resolution 949, 15 October 1994 - demands that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all
military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions and that Iraq not utilize its
military or any other forces again in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten its neighbors.
Resolution 1060, 12 June 1996 - demands unconditional access to military bases for UN special com-
mission of inspectors looking for weapons of mass destruction.
Resolution 1137, 12 November 1997 - demands that Iraq stop interfering with UN weapons inspections.
Resolution 1154, 2 March 1998 - affirms Iraq’s responsibility to comply with UNSCOM weapons
inspectors.
Resolution 1205, 5 November 1998 - condemns Iraq’s noncompliance with UNSCOM weapons inspectors.
164 All Security Council resolutions can be found on the UN website, arranged by year, at http://www.un.org/docu-
ments/scres.htm .










Resolution 1284, 17 December 1999 - establishes UNMOVIC, the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspections Commission. UNMOVIC replaced the former UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM) and continued the mandate to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (chemical,
biological weapons and missiles with a range of more than 150 km), and to operate a system of ongo-
ing monitoring and verification to check Iraq’s compliance.
Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002 – finds Iraq in material breach of resolution 687, calls on Iraq to
allow UNMOVIC to resume inspections.
Resolution 1472, 28 March 2003 – reminds parties in conflict of obligations under Geneva
Convention. Requests humanitarian aid for Iraq. Begin planning for the establishment of UN humani-
tarian and reconstruction missions in and around Iraq.
Oil for Food
Pre-Oil For Food
Resolution 706, 15 August 1991 - approves Iraqi oil revenues to pay for war damages.
Resolution 712, 19 September 1991 - allows $1.6 billion worth of Iraqi oil to be sold to benefit UN-
approved operations.
Oil for Food Mandate
Resolution 986, 14 April 1995 - regarding the authorization to permit the import of petroleum and
petroleum products originating in Iraq, as a temporary measure to provide for humanitarian needs of
the Iraqi people.
Other Oil for Food Resolutions
Resolution 1129, 12 September 1997 - authorizes states to permit the import of petroleum and petro-
leum products originating in Iraq within certain limits under the UN Oil for Food program.
Resolution 1143, 4 December 1997 - extends the Oil for Food program under which Iraq is allowed
to sell oil in exchange for food to prevent humanitarian crisis.
Resolution 1153, 20 February 1998 - increases the amount of oil—from USD 2 billion to more than
USD 5 million over a six month period—that Iraq will be allowed to sell to ensure that it can meet
the needs of its people.
Resolution 1158, 25 March 1998 - raises the ceiling temporarily on Iraqi oil exports.
Resolution 1175, 19 June 1998 - allows Iraq to rebuild its oil industry.
Resolution 1210, 24 November 1998 - extends Oil for Food program for another 180 days.
Resolution 1242, 21 May 1999 - extends Oil for Food for another 180 days U.S.. UK, and others.
Resolution 1266, 4 October 1999 - modifies paragraph 2 of resolution 1153 (as extended by resolu-
tion 1242) to the extent necessary to authorize States to permit the import of petroleum and petrole-
um products originating in Iraq. 










Resolution 1275, 19 November 1999 - extends Oil for Food program as stated in Resolution 1242
and 1266.
Resolution 1280, 3 December 1999 - extends Oil for Food program as stated in Resolution 1242 and 1266.
Resolution 1293, 31 March 2000 - authorizes $600 million to be used for reasonable expenses in the
production of petroleum in Iraq.
Resolution 1302, 8 June 2000 - decides that earlier provisions of resolution 986 shall remain in force.
Resolution 1330, 5 December 2000 - decides that earlier provisions of resolution 986 and others shall
remain in force.
Resolution 1352, 1 June 2001 - extends the provisions made in resolution 1330 and expresses its
intention to consider new arrangements for the sale and supply of commodities to Iraq for the facilita-
tion of civilian trade and economic cooperation in civilian sectors.
Resolution 1360, 3 July 2001 - extends the provisions made in resolution 986, calls upon excess
funds to be put toward humanitarian purchases, and calls for funds to be transferred into a
Compensation Fund and for that money to be used to help the Iraqi people.
Resolution 1443, 25 November 2002 - extends earlier provisions of resolution 1409 until 4 December 2002.
Resolution 1447, 4 December 2002 - extends earlier provisions of resolution 986 for an additional
180 days.
Resolution 1454, 30 December 2002 - extends earlier provisions of resolution 986 for an additional
180 days, approves implementation of Goods Review List.
Economic Sanctions
Resolution 1051, 27 March 1996 - regarding the approval of the mechanism for monitoring Iraqi
imports and exports, pursuant to Security Council resolutions and decisions 715. 
Resolution 1134, 23 October 1997 - threatens new sanctions unless Iraq cooperates with UN
weapons inspectors.
Resolution 1194, 9 September 1998 - suspends plans for sanctions review scheduled for October
until Iraq shows signs of compliance to UN demands.
Resolution 1382, 29 November 2001 - under Chapter 7, reaffirms embargo against Iraq, but calls for
changes in limited items to provide for humanitarian needs of Iraqi citizenry. Also calls on Iraq to ful-
fill its responsibility to provide for its citizens.
Resolution 1409, 14 May 2002 - under Chapter 7, continues trade sanctions against Iraq for 180
more days. Adopts new list of goods that can be sold to Iraq. Allows the use of funds held in escrow
to be used to finance humanitarian related purchases by Iraq.
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